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CURRENT History

APRIL, 1965

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How viable are the emerging states of Africa? Here, six specialists evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of various African states in 1965. On a continental scale, as our introductory article points out, "The O.A.U. provides a structure and a framework within which to discuss and define problems among African states and, hopefully, to reconcile differences and resolve disputes." So far, as he evaluates it, "The O.A.U. is an organization for establishing unity and not of unity."

The Organization of African Unity

By ARNOLD RIVKIN

*Economic Adviser to the Africa Department of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development*

THE VERY NAME Organization of African Unity reveals the nature of the organization. As with the name of the United Nations, so too with the name of the Organization of African Unity, it holds out more and seems to promise more than its charter is designed to accomplish or than the facts of (African) life will permit. It records an aspiration more than it reflects a reality. A change in preposition in the name of the organization—from “of” to “for”—would come considerably closer to historical reality, and would at the same time readjust downwards the inflated expectations which have sprung up around the organization, generated in no small part by its ill-advised selection of name. Although Shakespeare’s dictum that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet seems incontestable, the corollary does not

necessarily follow; a sunflower called a gardenia will not necessarily impart the same overpowering fragrance.

Thus, if the O.A.U. is viewed from the vantage point of its genesis and its charter (apart from the propagandistic overtones of its name and the surrounding plethora of statements of those who would propagate the myth of unity) one is able to see the organization in perspective, to understand better its possibilities and its limitations, and to assess its performance more realistically.¹

It is important to take account of its genesis, in order to understand and assess the performance of the O.A.U. The draft charter, which emerged largely intact from the founding conference of 31 heads of state and government at Addis Ababa in May, 1963, was the work of an eminent Chilean diplomat who had long represented his country as permanent representative to the Organization of American States. He undertook this special task of drafting a charter for an organization of African states at the personal in-

¹ This article draws heavily on my forthcoming book, *Nation-Building in Africa: Problems, Pre-conditions and Prospects*, particularly chapters 1 and 2, and on my recent book, *The African Presence in World Affairs: National Development and Its Role in Foreign Policy*, particularly chapters 1 and 2, and 8 through 12, for much of the background and analysis relating to the founding of the O.A.U.

vitation of the Emperor of Ethiopia. Understandably, he took for his model the charter of the O.A.S., the spirit and letter of which he knew well, both in precept and in practice. In fact, any comparative analysis of the charters of the two organizations, the O.A.U. and the O.A.S., will reveal striking similarities.

Without dwelling too much on the importance of names, it is pertinent to note that the name of the O.A.S. is, in fact, descriptive of the nature of the organization, whereas the name of the O.A.U. is not. The charter of the O.A.U., modeled on that of the O.A.S., is intended to provide a forum for exchanging views and resolving differences, machinery for carrying out decisions (for the most part on a voluntary basis), and a statement of principles to govern the behavior of African states, primarily in intra-African affairs. It does not purport to unify or unite the large and growing number of African states, compared to the relatively limited and unchanging number in Latin America, beyond providing a forum, establishing machinery which could be used if, as, and when, the membership agreed to use it, and proclaiming a minimal code of African interstate behavior. In this, once again it is consistent with its model, the O.A.S. charter.

The major departure in the charters of the two bodies is to be found in the African insistence on the inclusion of a provision in the O.A.U. charter requiring an annual heads of state or government meeting. This was an addition to Ambassador Manuel Trucco's original draft. The addition is, of course, revealing of the high African propensity for travel; an annual heads of state conference seems sure to provide a fertile wellspring for stimulating endless principal and auxiliary travel. It also provides a central stage for continental-wide spectacles with innumerable leading players. The founding Addis Ababa conference had so much pomp and ceremony laid on for the 31 heads of state and government (including set speeches by every head) that there was hardly any time in the two-week-long, May 15-28, 1963, meeting for the serious business of reconciling sharp differ-

ences on what the new organization should be like and for actually founding it. Only the existence of Señor Trucco's ready-made draft offered a last-minute solution, and narrowly averted a tragic ending to what was otherwise a ceremonial *tour de force*.

The realities of the African context at the time the O.A.U. was founded must also be kept in sight if the nature of the organization is to be understood, and its performance properly assessed.

THREE MAJOR GROUPINGS

At the time the O.A.U. was founded, Africa was more or less divided into three major groupings. The largest group by far was the Monrovia bloc, with a strength that varied but stood consistently in the neighborhood of 20 members. It was composed of all French-speaking African states south of the Sahara (other than Guinea and Mali) and, among others, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia, the Congo (Leopoldville). The Monrovia bloc stood for the proposition that each African state should be free to develop in its own image, according to its own decisions, and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of neighboring African states. It accepted the inherited boundary lines with which the new states came to independence, except insofar as all parties concerned agreed to peaceful changes, and advocated interstate African cooperation in the cultural, scientific and economic fields rather than advocating African "political union now" or at any time in the foreseeable future.

The second organized group was the Casablanca bloc, which was largely in disarray at the time of the O.A.U.'s founding because of internal quarrels and competing and at times conflicting aspirations among its leading members. The bloc consisted of three North African states, Morocco, Algeria and the United Arab Republic, and three sub-Saharan states, Ghana, Guinea and Mali. These were the "radical nationalist states," advocating "political union now"; a doctrine of national liberation, i.e., radicalization of the political process and drastic social reorganization throughout Africa, including the in-

dependent states as well as the remaining colonies, and intrusion in the internal affairs of other African states whenever necessary to accomplish these ends. They favored the adoption of a "non-alignment" posture in world affairs as an extension of their domestic policies. This involved characteristically a definite propensity to redirect existing political and economic ties away from Western Europe, particularly their former metropoles, and to an extent, from the United States, to the Communist bloc and elsewhere, e.g., the Belgrade neutralist bloc.

The third group was composed primarily of the most recently independent states, which either did not have the time or taste to become affiliated with either of the two blocs, or flirted with one or the other of the blocs momentarily. Tanganyika and Somalia, for example, were in and out of the Monrovia bloc, whereas Uganda and Kenya did not affiliate with either.

There was also present in the background at the time the still open problem of interrelating North Africa with Africa south of the Sahara. Although it was an article of faith with Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah, vividly articulated at the first Conference of Independent African States in Accra in 1958, that the Sahara Desert was a bridge and not a barrier between the two areas, it has continued to be something of a barrier or dividing line between the two markedly different areas. Many African states south of the Sahara have been suspicious of United Arab Republic designs going back to U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's view of Egypt's "civilizing mission" in "Black Africa" which he set out in 1955 in his book, *The Philosophy of the Revolution*. Others have resented the U.A.R.'s insistence on injecting its vendetta with Israel into African politics, particularly in the light of the friendly and even close relations many of the new African states maintain with Israel. Still others have been concerned about the implications for African solidarity of the non-African components envisaged at different times by Colonel Nasser for membership in the U.A.R. (By no stretch of the imagination can Syria

and Yemen be viewed as being in Africa.) Many have been disturbed by the U.A.R.'s apparent willingness to use growing Islamic influence in East Africa and beyond as a wedge for expanding its own influence and propagating its policies.

There is also the still unresolved problem of Morocco's territorial claim to all of Mauritania, which prevented Morocco from becoming an original member of the O.A.U. Most states south of the Sahara have tended to support Mauritania.

Also in the background there is a residue of the legacy left by the Arab slave traders. This has lingered and has had recent prominence in the bitter internal political struggle, involving increasing violence, in the Sudan between the "Arab North" and the "Black South."

In the months and weeks before the Addis Ababa conference of May, 1963, political maneuvering was intensified. The assassination in January of that year of President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo had a drastic effect on many African leaders and served to reinforce dramatically the wisdom of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sister African states. Even so radical a nationalist and leading member of the Casablanca bloc as Guinea, under President Sékou Touré, became alarmed at the shabby *coup d'état* which culminated in Olympio's assassination. Although never proven, many African leaders suspected Ghanaian complicity in the *coup d'état*, and resented Ghana's immediate recognition of the successor government. In fact, the successor government in Togo, headed by President Nicholas Grunitzky, was initially denied admission to the Addis conference.

This reaction to the Togo *coup*, coupled with a growing disenchantment with Nkrumah's propensity to equate African unity with casting himself in the role of "big brother" in West Africa and beyond, as well as a realistic assessment of the lack of cohesion and strength of the Casablanca bloc, led President Touré to break away from the Nkrumahist line of "political union now," and in effect to embrace the Monrovia bloc

doctrine of "live and let live." Most of the other members of the Casablanca bloc were also disenchanted with the bloc's lack of success and the internal conflicts which divided it. For example, Morocco and Algeria were long at odds over their mutual boundary; the U.A.R. and Ghana were continually at odds over the U.A.R.'s vigorous anti-Israeli policies; and Morocco and the U.A.R. had difficulties over the U.A.R.'s support for the disaffected Moroccan left-wing which found a refuge in Cairo and for its support of Algeria vis-à-vis Morocco. The Casablanca bloc states were ready for some alternative association. The non-affiliated states were unwilling to choose between the blocs, and, desirous of having an Africa-wide organization, also pushed in the direction of a new continental organization.

What remained was to define the terms and conditions for bringing the larger bloc, the Monrovia bloc, into a new organization, which did not violate its principles but at the same time would accommodate the non-affiliated states and provide an alternative for the states of the deteriorating Casablanca bloc. The solution had to be the lowest common denominator that the African states could agree on because the differences in principle were, as we have briefly suggested, sharp and meaningful. Hence, the realities of the African situation at the time the O.A.U. was founded, as well as the origin of its charter, suggested an organization of the type which actually emerged, an African version of the Organization of American States.

There can be no lingering doubt that there are many centers of power, authority, doctrine, policy, intrigue and attraction in Af-

² The Union of African and Malagasy States (the U.A.M.) did in fact transform itself during 1964 into the Union of African and Malagasy States for Economic Cooperation (U.A.M.C.E.). The Brazzaville bloc consists of the Central African Republic, Congo (Leopoldville), Gabon, Malagasy, Senegal and Chad. Although the full meaning of the change is not entirely clear, in theory at any rate the U.A.M.C.E. will only be concerned with economic matters, whereas the O.A.U. will be concerned with political affairs.

³ As quoted in *Cahiers de l'Afrique Occidentale et de l'Afrique Equatoriale* (Paris), June 15, 1963, pp. 33-34. (Translation from the French by the present author.)

rica. The multidimensional African presence can no longer be denied; African states like states elsewhere in the world, will develop their own national personalities, their own national interests and their own national styles for expressing their personalities and interests.

Polycentrism, not Pan-Africanism (at least not the Pan-Africanism conceived by its foremost apostle, President Nkrumah of Ghana) is to be the guiding force in African interstate relations. The Addis Ababa conference spelled this out in the charter for the newly constituted Organization of African Unity. And two of the leading statesmen at the Addis Ababa conference, one from the French-speaking world and one from the English-speaking world, left no room to doubt the meaning of Addis Ababa for all who would take heed in major public pronouncements soon after the conference.

In the somewhat stylized but nevertheless precise Gallic formulation of the Poet-President of Senegal, Léopold Sédar Senghor, commenting on the Addis Ababa conference:

We overcame this opposition ["between reformers and revolutionaries."] We have united that which unites us and left aside that which divides us. It is one step toward African unity: the assembly of heads of state [of the Organization of African Unity founded at the Addis Ababa Conference] has in effect a decision-making power. There is in addition a secretariat, an African group at the U.N., specialized commissions, etc.

At no time did we renounce collaboration with Europe or with Asia or with France. Also in Africa, we do not envisage the disappearance of the Union of African and Malagasy States [the Brazzaville bloc]² which constitutes a regional group.

I have the same idea of African unity as General de Gaulle has of European unity. It is necessary to build an Africa of the Fatherlands. We are in fact very different from one another, from the point of view of culture and language as well as race.³

In the understated English idiom of the Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, reporting to the Nigerian nation on the Addis Ababa conference:

Just as we in Nigeria have been laying down

one stone after another in the process of nation-building, thus ensuring that a solid foundation is laid; just as we are determined to preserve our unity in diversity; so the Addis Ababa conference concentrated in those fields where the links between our states can be reinforced and strengthened and where new links can be forged while recognizing the fact that unity should not be tantamount to uniformity.⁴

In short, the total leadership of independent Africa assembled in Addis Ababa officially discovered (what many of them had long sensed), after listening to what each of the national delegations had to say, that there was an African consensus—approaching unanimity—on the guiding principles for the organization of their vast continent. In the words of the charter of the Organization of African Unity:

The Member States . . . solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:

1. the sovereign equality of all Member States;
2. noninterference in the internal affairs of States;
3. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member State and for its inalienable right to independent existence;
4. peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration;
5. unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighboring States or any other states.⁵

This is simply the inter-African code of behavior of the Monrovia bloc of African states and, just as simply, the repudiation of the inter-African code of behavior of the Casablanca bloc of African states. The Monrovia bloc had its code of behavior ratified and adopted by the 31 states in attendance at Addis Ababa. The Casablanca bloc, as we have already noted, was in serious internal disarray before the Addis Ababa conference and completed the formalities for making its cause official by acceding to the Monrovia bloc code of nationalism in one land, or multiple roads to national, political and economic development, and foregoing its doctrine of

⁴ As quoted in *Federal Nigeria*, Vol. VI, No. 5 (June-July, 1963), p. 6.

⁵ Article III, Chapter of the Organization of African Unity.

⁶ *Federal Nigeria*, op. cit. p. 6.

continent-wide “political union now,” as the sole road to the promised land of development for the African nationalists.

There could be no misunderstanding about what happened at the Addis Ababa conference. At the very time it was happening the Nigerian Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar, made it abundantly clear in his forthright address to the conference:

As I have said, we have to start from the beginning. I have listened to speeches in this Conference, and there have been only a very few members who spoke on the desirability of having a political union. Almost all of the speeches indicate that a more practical approach is much preferred by the majority of the delegations. I am glad to say that the stand we have taken right from the beginning is the stand of nearly all the countries in the Conference.⁶

The implications of what amounted to the absorption of the Casablanca bloc by the Monrovia bloc at Addis Ababa—the recognition of African diversity, of African polycentrism, of multiple roads to national development—are many and varied. Yet the implication is inescapable that for the most part the African states would now proceed with their nation-building, by and large, within their geographic borders—except in special, and probably relatively rare cases, where frontiers were altered by peaceful negotiation of *all* of the equally sovereign parties. In the view of the author this implication is so central to the future pattern, scale and prospects for African political and economic development, as to be one of the keys to what lies ahead for the continent.

What the Addis conference suggested, the Cairo conference crystallized. The African presence in world affairs is characterized by a wide diversity of states pursuing a multiplicity of courses in their internal nation-building and economic development. This diversity is most clearly characterized by the “unity amid diversity” being practiced within the framework of the Organization of African Unity, and by the rejection or exposure of the dream of continental organic unity “here and now” as a myth or “cover” for the national interests of particular African states.

The clash at Cairo in July, 1964, between

President Julius Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, now Tanzania, and President Nkrumah made this unmistakably clear. Commenting on Nkrumah's renewed plea for an immediate union of all independent African states at the Cairo conference, Nyerere declared:

This union government business has become a cover for doing some of the most unbrotherly things in Africa.⁷

Nyerere went on:

What was needed was not more preaching about unity but the practicing of unity.⁸

Finally, summing it all up, the Commonwealth correspondent for *The Observer* (London) wrote:

The clash between Nyerere and Nkrumah today was not just a clash of personalities or between two jealous rivals. It reflected deep-seated difference of policies and attitudes between Africa's leaders.

The minority view is Nkrumah's—indeed it is difficult to find any other leader committed to supporting his crusade to set up an African union here and now. Nyerere speaks for the great majority, but unlike the great majority, Nyerere showed himself ready today to say what his colleagues prefer to say in private.⁹

There could be little doubt about the majority position. In the words of *The New York Times'* dispatch from Cairo:

Mr. Nyerere espoused the more popular step-by-step approach, on the ground that final union now was impossible. The Tanganyikan received an ovation at the close of his speech, which he said he had not wanted to make.¹⁰

Everything that has happened since Cairo has served to reinforce the "spirit of Addis," particularly insofar as it relates to national development by the newly independent states in light of their own national interests. For example, the new state of Malawi, which achieved independence on the eve of the Cairo conference, and Zambia, which became independent since, have taken a markedly less

⁷ *The New York Times*, July 21, 1964.

⁸ *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, July 21, 1964.

⁹ Colin Legum in *The Observer* (London), reprinted in *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, July 21, 1964.

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, *op. cit.*

¹¹ As quoted in *East Africa and Rhodesia* (London), July 9, 1964, p. 850.

intractable line in their relationships with Portugal and the European settler government of Southern Rhodesia than has been the vogue among other African states. This is undoubtedly because of their landlocked geographical location, with their only access to the sea through Portuguese Mozambique and the intermediate state of Southern Rhodesia. Their trade and commercial relations continue much as before with these outcasts on the African continent. And their nation-building and economic development reflect this state of affairs.

In each state, nation-building has not been predicated on threats from colonial states and unity induced on this basis. On the contrary, economic development has been stressed as an instrumentality for building internal cohesion and, to this end, friendly relations with the disliked "colonial" governments of Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique have been studiously cultivated. Malawi, for example, has entered into an arrangement with Southern Rhodesia under which it will receive £400,000 annually from Salisbury in return for not imposing tariffs on most manufactured goods imported from Rhodesia. (Approximately 50 percent of Malawi's manufactured imports come from Southern Rhodesia.)

Innumerable other instances reveal African states pursuing their own routes to nation-building and development. The examples of two of the newest states, however, should suffice to illustrate the point and at the same time suggest that the tendency to polycentrism in Africa is likely to be reinforced as the remaining colonial territories achieve sovereignty and delineate their national interests. In the colorful words of H. Kamuzu Banda Prime Minister of Malawi:

I have four million people to look after. To do what I think is best in their interest I will do anything. I will even have the devil as my ally.¹¹

THE PERFORMANCE OF THE O.A.U.

At the second heads of state conference, a Cairo, July 21-23, 1964, the world witnessed the bitter clash between President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania, and Osagyefo

the President, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. In addition, there was 'the unprecedented spectacle of a friendly government leader, Prime Minister Moïse Tshombe of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), being held for days literally under house arrest, outside Cairo, by President Nasser of the United Republic, and thus being prevented from attending the meeting of the highest council of the organization. The reasons assigned for this indignity were disapproval of Tshombe's internal policies and his alleged complicity in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the first prime minister of the Congo. The United Arab Republic's exclusion of Tshombe was upheld by the O.A.U. heads of state conference in the face of outspoken criticism by any number of African heads of state who quoted phrase after phrase of the O.A.U. charter, particularly from articles II, III and V, pledging non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.

In the end, principle yielded to the emotions and exigencies of the moment and the O.A.U. set a precedent which will inevitably return to haunt it time and again when any leader becomes sufficiently unpopular with his peers.

A year earlier, when Togolese participation in the Addis Ababa conference was being debated, it was the Ghanaian delegation which so clearly assessed the implications of excluding Togolese representatives when it argued:

Togo is a sovereign independent African state with a government acceptable to its people. What right have we to question the sovereign right of the Togolese people to choose their government by any method they desire?¹²

If African states constituted themselves into a kind of organization of African states in which

¹² Kojo Botsio, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Ghana, as quoted in *Ghana Today* (London; The Ghana Office), Vol. 7, June 5, 1963, p. 2.

¹³ *Ghana Today*, op. cit.

¹⁴ *The Financial Times* (London), September 22, 1964, *The Times* (London), September 24 and October 6, 1964, *West Africa* (London), No. 2471, October 10, 1964, and *The Sunday Times* (London), October 11, 1964. Also see *The Congo Magazine* (Leopoldville), December, 1964, for an entire issue devoted to the Congolese government's point of view.

any one state could be held to ransom by others because of the disapproval or dislike for the internal arrangement within that state, then African unity would be doomed at birth.¹³

At Cairo, there was no question of the legitimacy of the Congolese government. But because Ghana disapproved of the Tshombe government, the principles and the prediction based on them were conveniently forgotten. African unity, even if not "doomed," was not well served by the Cairo performance. Hardly a month after the Congo was denied the right to be represented by its Prime Minister at the Cairo conference, the O.A.U. convened a special conference of O.A.U. foreign ministers at Addis Ababa to deal with the growing Congo crisis. Tshombe headed his country's delegation to the meeting. Here the O.A.U. missed its opportunity for decisive action, passed an equivocal resolution, and appointed a conciliation commission. (For texts of resolutions by the O.A.U. and the U.N. on the Congo; see page 236 of this issue.)

This special commission's activities came to nothing, and its initiatives were largely ignored after Prime Minister Tshombe's appearance before the commission. The Congolese delegation objected to the commission's treating with the Congolese rebels as equal parties with the legal government and concentrating on the internal aspects of the rebellions rather than dealing with the serious complaints of the Congolese government against its neighbors, Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi, charged with providing privileged sanctuaries to the rebels, bases for their military operations and facilities for smuggling in arms and munitions, and channels for external Communist assistance.¹⁴

The failure of the O.A.U. to take effective actions in the Congo reflects the polycentrism of Africa, the diversity and clash of national interests, and the fact that the O.A.U. has limited jurisdiction, and even more limited capabilities, under its charter. And when it goes beyond that charter, in the absence of a consensus approaching unanimity, it inevitably invites failure.

The Casablanca bloc tendency persists, and the United Arab Republic, Algeria, Ghana,

Guinea and Mali (all former Casablanca bloc members) have been in the vanguard in open support of the Congolese rebels, along with Congo (Brazzaville), Burundi, Sudan and Kenya. President Ben Bella of Algeria and President Nasser have proclaimed this support as national policy and have been shipping large quantities of arms and munitions to the rebels via Sudan. Prime Minister Tshombe has protested to the Secretary-General of the United Nations against this "virtual declaration of war" by Algeria, the U.A.R., and the Sudan on the Congo.¹⁵

The Monrovia bloc tendency also persists, and has manifested itself in the desire of such states as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Senegal, Malagasy and Togo to avoid interference in the internal political struggle in the Congo. They favored O.A.U. approval (at its special Addis Ababa meeting on the Congo) of the abortive request of the Congo government for African troops from Nigeria, Ethiopia, Liberia, Senegal and Malagasy to replace the "white mercenaries" of the Congo government and assist in the restoration of law and order, *i.e.*, to suppress the Congolese rebellions in much the same way as the United Kingdom did in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya at the request of the respective embattled governments of those countries.

Finally, any number of African states would like to avoid taking sides, but through force of circumstances must vote, and hence decide, to support one or the other tendency: Casablanca or Monrovia. The African states split down the middle in the maneuvering behind the compromise resolution finally adopted by the Security Council on December 30, 1964, in a very dramatic installment of the continuing Congo crisis. The former Casablanca bloc members, with the exception of Morocco, were in the vanguard of states condemning the Belgian-American-British "rescue operation" in the Congo as "neo-colonialism" and "interference in the internal affairs of the Congo," without mentioning the open support of Communist China, the Soviet bloc and any number of African states of the various rebel movements in the Congo. Nigeria

and Senegal and most of the other leaders of the former Monrovia bloc successfully resisted this pressure and induced support for a compromise resolution which merely "deplored" what has been going on in the Congo. This compromise resolution was surely in keeping with the long line of compromise resolutions and equivocal behavior of the United Nations and the African states generally in the Congo over the last four and one half years.

There has obviously been no overwhelming consensus, nor is there likely to be one, on the Congo crisis in the O.A.U., any more than there has been one in the United Nations. Both organizations have many conflicting tendencies. In the Congo, the United Nations withdrew in the face of the onset of the rebellions and, ever since, the O.A.U. has been unable to find an acceptable *modus vivendi* for coping with the rebellions. In face of the United Nations' limited capacity, there seems little reason to be surprised by the O.A.U.'s inability to do so, particularly in light of its genesis and background.

In two earlier cases, the border warfare between Morocco and Algeria, and the continuing three-way fighting among Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, the African organization has served the useful but limited role of "honest broker" in obtaining formal "cease-fire" agreements, without mediating or resolving the underlying disputes. Without in any way minimizing what has been achieved, careful observers of the African scene have noted a tendency in the O.A.U. to conceal fundamental disparities and cover basic differences by surface agreements. There has, indeed, been much indiscriminate posturing about the

(Continued on page 240)

Arnold Rivkin has recently returned from Sierra Leone, where he served as Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister. Since 1950, he has been concerned with African affairs as a lawyer, aid official, economist and academician. He is the author of *The African Presence in World Affairs* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), *Africa and the West* (New York: Praeger, 1962), and the forthcoming *Nation-Building in Africa*.

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, December 30, 1964.

This specialist finds a widely divergent pattern evolving in these two new countries—once one—now facing each other across the Zambezi River. Already independent, Zambia still faces problems, but they are "certainly no greater than those of most African countries, and a good deal less than some." At the same time, in Rhodesia, "African nationalism finds itself facing a local settler population with all the confidence born of forty years of internal self-government. . . . [its] parties being banned . . . assets confiscated . . . leaders detained, and . . . organizations broken up."

Zambia and Rhodesia: A Study in Contrast

By RICHARD BROWN

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IN THE YEAR since the dissolution of the Central African Federation on December 31, 1963, Northern Rhodesia has become Zambia by an unexceptional transition to independent statehood, while Southern Rhodesia, now simply Rhodesia, has remained enmeshed in a bitter power struggle.¹ More than ever the Zambezi River which divides the two countries has seemed the boundary between triumphant "black" nationalism to the north and embattled "white" nationalism to the south.

Zambia, a landlocked country a little larger than the state of Texas, attained its independence from Britain at subdued ceremonies on October 24, 1964, after a period of swift political progress. It was only late in 1962 that Africans first participated in the cabinet government and only in January, 1964, that Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (U.N.I.P.) won the elections which introduced universal suffrage and full internal self-government. Perhaps benefiting from experience in other former British

colonies in Africa, the constitution which was subsequently drawn up for the new state included some novel features, described by the British Colonial Secretary as being a mixture of both the British and American constitutions and "a very wise and proper balance between the need to create a strong executive and the need to safeguard individuals and minorities." Thus Zambia not only began life as a republic, the first former British dependency to do so immediately on attaining independence, but also with Kaunda occupying a strong presidential office.

Zambia is fortunate in being the wealthiest of the former British colonies in East and Central Africa and is, after the United States, the largest producer of copper outside the Communist bloc. Minerals account for more than 90 per cent of Zambia's exports and, in 1963, were worth about 350 million dollars; the mining industry is by far the largest employer of labor. The Copperbelt is a strip of land 90 miles long and 30 miles wide lying close to the Congo border and containing some 20 to 25 per cent of the world's known reserves of recoverable copper. However, although the revenue derived from copper promises to sustain a fairly rapid rate

¹ For general background to this article and to the break-up of the Federation in particular, see "The Rhodesias and Nyasaland," by F. M. G. Willson in the March, 1964, issue of this journal (Vol. 46, No. 271).

of development in the future, it would be unwise to underestimate the problems which face the new country.

For all its wealth, Zambia entered independence with fewer than 100 African college graduates and a woefully undeveloped secondary educational system. This means that Zambia must rely heavily on highly paid expatriates in many key positions which, apart from being expensive, can quickly lead, as experience in other newly-independent countries has shown, to bitterness and frustration. Alternatively, at the same time, inadequately trained Africans have to be promoted to skilled positions prematurely. The lack of trained Africans arises, in part, from the fact that Zambia has always had a sizable white minority occupying the top positions.² To complicate the situation further, in the months before independence many European civil servants chose to accept generous retirement terms rather than stay in Zambia. This has made way for some Zambians to be promoted as they have become trained, but at the cost of an initial loss of efficiency in such essential services as health, police, mail and communications.

Zambia is the envy of many other African countries in suffering neither an acute land shortage nor a significantly large European farming class. Yet with a population increase in the region of 3 per cent per annum, agricultural development is clearly a vital consideration—as a means both to raise food output and to diversify an economy overly dependent on a single export subject to disconcerting fluctuations in price. The development of secondary industry, considerably inhibited in the past ten years by Zambia's membership in the Federation, has already begun to take place.

FRICtIONS IN ZAMBIA

The relationship between Lusaka, the capital city, and the Copperbelt, or, in different terms, between the government and the work-

ers, is another problem facing the new country. Even before independence there were signs of serious friction between them, and trade unionists have been given a smaller role in the U.N.I.P. government than might have been expected from the prominent part they played in awakening Zambia's modern political consciousness. In addition, Lusaka is some 200 miles from the Copperbelt, which in any case, has long had characteristics of a state within a state: sheer distance itself helps to exacerbate relations between the center of authority and the center of wage employment. Already there are grumblings that the construction boom associated with the end of federation and the beginning of independence is occurring mainly in the capital and that the Copperbelt is being ignored. More significant is the fact that the copper industry is owned by giant combines representing American and British investors. Since the Copperbelt workers are relatively well-organized and can claim to have spearheaded the nationalist movement they are unlikely to remain content with a system whereby foreign owned capital governs or appears to govern their lives. Moreover, despite some progress in the past few years, there is still a wide gulf between the wages of the unskilled African labor force (over 40,000 in number) and those of the skilled artisans (over 8,000), nearly all of whom are whites.

It seems inevitable that the Copperbelt's wage earners will compare their gains from independence unfavorably with the ministerial luxury of Lusaka. Even if the government succeeds in gaining a strong hold over the unions, as has happened elsewhere, it is doubtful whether it can permanently hold down the aspirations of the African labor force. Kaunda's dilemma is the not unfamiliar one of wishing to maintain conditions attractive to foreign investors while, at the same time, attempting to meet the "crisis of expectations" brought about by independence. The reasonably high level of development of the Copperbelt which gives Zambia its modest prosperity, at the same time makes this dilemma the more acute.

As for the rest of the country, it too is at

² The June, 1963, census gave the following overall population figures: about 3.5 million Africans; 76,000 Europeans; and 11,000 others, mainly Asians.

present but loosely linked to the center. Under the colonial regime there was little development in the rural areas and the U.N.I.P. will have considerable difficulty in involving remote subsistence farmers in the new nation's drive for national unity and progress. An extreme example of what can happen is provided by the Lampa tragedy. The Lamas, an African separatist church led by self-styled prophetess Alice Lenshina, suddenly, in the August before independence, rose in rebellion against the U.N.I.P. government. Lampa church members rushed into battle regardless of the consequences, and many hundreds were killed in the attempt to restore order. Exactly what lay behind this uprising is not known, but it is believed that the act had been harried by U.N.I.P. members or being apolitical.

Another particular problem is posed by the southern Province, home of the Ila-Tonga peoples and heartland of the African National Congress (A.N.C.). Its leader is the vily veteran nationalist Harry Nkumbula who dominated the nationalist movement in the 1950's until Kaunda broke away and formed the more dynamic U.N.I.P. Though the A.N.C., which won 10 of the 65 main roll seats (a further 10 seats were reserved for the European vote) in the January, 1964, elections, will probably wither away as similar parties have done or are doing in other African countries, it is much less likely that the people who support it will readily transfer their wholehearted loyalty to President Kaunda.

EXTERNAL CONCERNs

Yet another concern is provided by the geographical position of Zambia and its influence on external policy. Kaunda is a convinced Pan-Africanist and Chairman of the Pan African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa. Zambia is, therefore, in the front line of the fight against colonialism to the south, but, like neighboring Malawi, Zambia has also to live with the distasteful white regimes in the bordering countries of Portuguese East and West Africa and with her former federal partner, Rho-

desia, to the south. It is this latter relationship which is certain to be the most difficult. Already the two countries are forced by circumstances to cooperate in such matters as the Kariba Hydro Electric Scheme, the railways and the airways; in addition, Zambia is heavily dependent on imports from Rhodesia and South Africa. But this is not to the liking of most Zambians and strong demands to aid the African nationalist movement in Rhodesia are likely to come from within Zambia and from other African countries. Zambia at present depends on the railway outlets through the Congo and Angola to the west coast and through Rhodesia and Mozambique to the east coast for the export of her copper. An early start has been made in exploring the feasibility of building a new railway line to reach the sea through Zambia's Pan-African neighbor, Tanzania. Attractive as this is politically, it looks at the moment as though the project makes dubious economic sense.

Kaunda and his chief lieutenants are well aware of these problems and are determined to tackle them. Kaunda has already won the respect and admiration of many foreign observers, as well as of many Europeans in Zambia, but this does little to guarantee him his position. On the contrary, the reputation of being a moderate is often an embarrassment in modern Africa, and to remain leader of a comprehensive national party which embraces many competing interests formerly held in check by the struggle for independence is a difficult task. Personal rivalries and constant pressure from the most radical elements in the U.N.I.P. are a threat to his position. He is fortunate to be a member of one of the smaller tribes which collectively fear domination by the two largest—the Bemba and the Lozi, who likewise fear each other. Amid the personal rivalries in the U.N.I.P. leadership, this point may prove Kaunda's salvation.

Zambia's problems are certainly no greater than those of most African countries, and a good deal less than some. Zambia looks at the moment to have a generally more prosperous, stable and happy future than her neighbor to the south.

CONTEST IN RHODESIA

In Rhodesia it has become clearer than ever that the political contest is essentially whether a country about the size of California shall be ruled by its 220,000 European or its 4 million African inhabitants. The half-hearted endeavors of the former ruling United Federal Party (U.F.P.) to win significant African support for gradual reform while retaining control of the European dominated political system have proved barren. The 1962 decision of the white electorate to reject the U.F.P. in favor of the right-wing Rhodesia Front has been even more decisively confirmed by events in 1964, while African nationalists have maintained their boycott of the existing constitution and continue to refuse to have anything to do with a system that does not speedily guarantee them majority rule.³

The past twelve months have seen the consolidation of power in the hands of the Rhodesia Front and a sustained attempt to wrest complete independence from Britain under the country's existing constitution. Britain, while refusing the demand of the Afro-Asian nations that she intervene with force if necessary to bring about majority rule, has nonetheless made it clear that a broadly representative franchise is the *sine qua non* of a negotiated independence. The Rhodesia Front derives its support mainly from the farming community, the white artisans, and the small businessmen, shopkeepers, and lower paid white-collar workers. Many of these people owe their privileged position to their skin color and have fixed assets in Rhodesia which, in turn, makes it difficult for them to move elsewhere and retain the high standard of living they now enjoy. They believe that white supremacy and total separation from Britain, with or without her consent, is both possible and desirable, and they


welcomed the quickening pace of events April, 1964, when the relatively mild Winston Field was ousted as prime minister by the much more forceful Ian Smith, who had been minister of finance.

Smith soon proved to be an emotional and popular leader for most of the Europeans—leader bent on arousing an assertive "white nationalism to counter "black" nationalism; and to gain support for a policy of bold confrontation on the independence issue with Britain. Where Field had kept the independence issue merely hot, Smith was determined to bring it to the boil; and boiling has been for most of the time since. However, just as Field had been forced to abandon July 6 (Malawi's date for independence) as the target for Rhodesia, so too did Smith fail in his quest for independence by Christmas, 1964. This was not for want of trying. It is too early to say whether his failure was due to the stern warnings about sanctions issued by the British prime minister in October (when a unilateral declaration of independence appeared imminent); or to Sir Roy Welensky's intervention a little earlier; or to behind-the-scenes pressure from powerful business interests.

Talk of unilateral action and a "Boston Tea Party" had brought Welensky, the former Federal Prime Minister, back into active politics. Ironically, he was now opposing policies he had himself at one time championed for the Federation as a whole. Briefly replacing Sir Edgar Whitehead as leader of the opposition Rhodesia National Party (the former U.F.P.), he fought a by-election in an apparently safe seat. His decisive defeat made clear the white electorate's increased faith in Smith and his policies. The result of the November, 1964, referendum on independence further confirmed Smith's hold on European opinion as well as showing the political polarization between the "white" and "black" nationalism.

The referendum was part of Smith's plan to demonstrate to the British government that he had the broad consent of all the people in his bid for independence. However, the twelve thousand African voters had over

³ Many have held, including Willson, *op. cit.*, that participation under the "Whitehead Constitution" of 1961 would have brought the African nationalists to power within fifteen years. However, it has been fairly clearly shown that without a massive and quite improbable expansion of African secondary education this estimate is highly optimistic. See the *Central African Examiner*, August and October, 1964, issues.



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whelmingly boycotted the referendum and the methods chosen to consult the rest of the African population did not satisfy either Britain's former Conservative or her present Labor governments. Under conditions of close surveillance, 622 chiefs and headmen were brought together in a meeting or "inaba" at which they indicated their support for independence under the present constitution "on behalf of their people." This method not only ignored the views of the large number of Africans who live in urban areas and are not voters (and who certainly oppose independence under a white minority government), but also overlooked the immense changes that the seventy years of European administration have brought to the institution of chieftainship. To regard the

chiefs as still the natural spokesmen of Africans living in the rural areas was to ignore that they are now appointed, paid and dismissable by the government and have a vested interest in the current political structure which African nationalism is seeking to change.

Although Smith failed in his attempt to gain independence by Christmas, his tough tactics have gone far towards silencing his white and black critics within Rhodesia and the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence in spite of world opinion remains. The main factor operating to prevent it seems to be the unease of the larger business interests at the probable economic consequences, though Smith and his cabinet profess to believe that only independence

under the white minority will get the economy moving rapidly enough again to attract the large investments of foreign capital which have been conspicuously absent in the past few years. Ordinary European opinion is perhaps best summed up in the statement by a group of tobacco farmers who, despite warnings from their own association that a unilateral declaration could bring ruin to the tobacco industry (Rhodesia's major export), declared that they preferred to risk the consequences of such a declaration rather than accept African majority government. Since the dissolution of the Federation the economy has remained more buoyant than many predicted, but it remains true that, apart from some spectacular developments in the "low-veld," there is little overall expansion. The heavy cost of maintaining internal security helps to prevent much needed measures to relieve unemployment, expand African education, and raise the productivity of African agriculture. Most informed observers believe that Rhodesia's economy could not long withstand an economic siege in the event of a unilateral declaration.

FUTURE FOR NATIONALISM?

Smith has been greatly aided in consolidating the position of the Rhodesia Front by the weakness of the now-banned African nationalist parties—the People's Caretaker Council, led by Joshua Nkomo, and the Zimbabwe African National Union, led by Ndabaningi Sithole. The often violent internecine warfare between them in the first half of the year and their inadequacies in organization made it all the easier for Smith to crush them, which he did in August—using the stringent security legislation inherited from previous governments and much added to it within the past year. The dissolution of the Federation has perhaps fully brought home to African nationalists for the first time the immense task they face in winning control in Rhodesia. Their struggle has a wholly different character from that in the former federal territories of Malawi and Zambia. In British colonies to the north of the Zambezi, African nationalism gained its immediate aim of majority rule

relatively swiftly once it had shown it had mass support and was capable of disrupting the smooth operation of colonial government. In Rhodesia, by contrast, African nationalism finds itself facing a local settler population with all the confidence born of forty years of internal self-government. On four occasions since 1959, African nationalism has reached the stage which in the north led to British concessions, but in Rhodesia led to the party being banned, their assets confiscated, their leaders detained, and their organization broken up. In circumstances such as these it seems inevitable that African nationalism will not only become increasingly anti-European, but will also go underground and commence a violent revolutionary struggle, difficult though this will be to organize. Indeed the past year has seen some small beginning in these directions.

The cost, both moral and material, of maintaining European rule in Rhodesia is already high. It is no exaggeration to say that it is now only maintained by resort to the method of the police state. The government itself admitted that by September, 1964, over 2,000 persons had been detained, restricted, or imprisoned for political offenses. Also, on its own admission, the government now believes that it cannot govern properly if there is free flow of information. At the time of the banning of the two African nationalist parties, it also banned permanently the *Africa Daily News*, a newspaper owned by the British Press magnate, Lord Thomson, and the only one providing news mainly for and about the African community. The remaining newspapers, all of whom oppose to some degree the Rhodesia Front government, find themselves under attack from a section of the European population, including cabinet ministers.

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Richard Brown served as a research assistant for the History of Parliament Trust in London before joining the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1958. He will soon take a post in the School of African and Asian Studies at the new University of Sussex, England.

This author finds that "the official 'new look' emerging in West Africa is one of austerity. Government salaries are cut, the 'rights' of civil servants curtailed, development plans readjusted." He further notes that "the movement which began with the satisfaction of ideal wants now has shifted to more prosaic material wants . . . [and] the problem is the maintenance of a sufficient degree of enthusiasm to sustain a long period of personal sacrifice, and of postponing some material advantages for the sake of society . . ."

New Motifs in West Africa

By WALTER A. E. SKURNIK

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FOR MANY WEST AFRICANS, 1964 was a year of political turbulence and economic malaise. Internal political problems came from two major sources. One was the security threat posed by various minority groups; the other was disputes among some of the political leaders, in or out of office, and the resulting efforts to unseat opponents and to control the decision-making process.

Three minority groups stood out as serious sources of unrest. The Touareg tribesmen, in the Adrar mountains of the Mali Republic, rebelled against the Bamako government. That rebellion was apparently crushed by the end of the year, after the bulk of the Mali armed forces had fought the Touareg for over one year.¹

The Tiv in Northern Nigeria continued to complain that the ruling Northern People's Congress prevented them from having an ef-

fective voice in their own affairs and to demand administrative autonomy. Following several riots during which scores were killed and hundreds arrested, the federal government intervened with troops to help local law enforcement agents restore order.

And, thirdly, Niger was the scene of "commando" raids in the South, especially in the town of Maradi, one-time power base of Djibo Bakary, the exiled former head of the Niger government. Several Bakary followers, including his chief lieutenant, were executed at the end of 1964 in Niamey before crowds of spectators summoned by government soundtrucks for the occasion.

The tensions among the national leaders continued to be a major handicap to political stability in 1964. Four examples illustrate the dimensions of this problem. In the Ivory Coast, the most celebrated personality who turned against President Félix Houphouët-Boigny was Ernest Boka, widely respected former education minister and president of the Supreme Court. Boka had been arrested in 1963 on charges of complicity in a plot to overthrow the government. He committed suicide in 1964, apparently leaving behind a "testament" which acknowledged that he had intentionally hired known French Communists, and propitiated sorcerers to dispose of the Ivoirien president.

¹ According to Mali authorities, the deaths of two prominent national leaders, Messrs. Fily Dabo Sissoko and Hamadoun Dicko, were caused by the rebellion. Both Sissoko and Dicko were former opponents of President Modibo Kéita and joined forces with him after independence. Both were condemned to death in 1963 following serious opposition by Mali's merchants to the creation of a new Mali currency. And both, according to the government, were shot to death by Touareg while trying to escape from an army truck attacked by the rebels. These explanations are regarded as mysterious by African and other observers who question their accuracy.

In Ghana, after another attempt to assassinate President Kwame Nkrumah, the one-party state was firmly anchored in Ghana's constitution in order to channel all political activity through the Convention People's Party. The six M.P.'s formerly tolerated in the legislature as the official opposition were thus deprived of a voice. Moreover, the constitutional changes ratified in January, 1964, by a popular referendum gave Nkrumah full discretion to remove any judge from his post. This was done in response to a Special Court verdict which Nkrumah found politically undesirable, and tended to increase the Redeemer's aura of infallibility as the leader of people, party, executive, legislature, and judiciary.

In Senegal, the ruling party successfully absorbed key elements of a small opposition party created in December, 1961, the *Bloc des Masses Sénégalaïses* (B.M.S.). Dissident B.M.S. members led by Cheikh Anta Diop, and some supporters of former Premier Mamadou Dia, combined forces in August, 1964, to form a new party, the *Front National Sénégalaïs*. But that party was promptly dissolved by the government which sought to continue its past policy of assimilating opponents rather than to allow them to build popular support.

In Nigeria, the federal election of December, 1964, reflected a longtime dispute among those who would walk and those who would run on the path to social, economic, and political development. The dispute coincided with antagonisms between North and South and between the larger ethnic groups in the federation.

The North-South conflict had found expression in demands for a new federal population census, which took place in late 1963. Since the new census "revealed" that the North contained a little over half Nigeria's 55,620,000 people, Southern leaders denounced the results as fraudulent, but eventually came to accept it as inevitable.

Ethnic tensions were visible nearly every-

where, and sharpened considerably with the approaching election. Frictions occurred, roughly, in two dimensions. First, within each of the four regions, where minority groups oppose the dominant group (although the Yoruba majority in the West is split politically); and second, between the regions, since the group dominant in one region seeks support in others.

However, the political alignments preceding the election were based chiefly on the running-walking controversy, and took the shape of two interregional alliances. The sprinters formed the United Progressive Grand Alliance, made up of the Nigerian Citizens National Council which controls the East and Mid-West Regions, and such groups as Chief Obafemi Awolowo's Action Group (the opposition party in the West) and the National Progressive Front (the major opposition party in the North). The conservatives, in turn, founded the Nigerian National Alliance, which included the ruling parties in the North and West (Sir Ahmadu Bello's Northern People's Congress and Chief S. L. Akintola's Nigerian National Democratic Party), and smaller groups such as the Mid-West Democratic Front.

The campaign was stormy and at times violent. Southern candidates were allegedly prevented from contesting seats in the North, several candidates were killed in the heat of the campaign, and hundreds of polling booths were destroyed by thugs. Federal President Nnamdi Azikiwe, the dean of nationalism in the East, deplored that "what is happening in Nigeria today does not inspire me to be optimistic that we shall survive as one nation."² Throughout much of the South, voters heeded a call to boycott the election, and there were more outcries of secession.

In the end, a compromise was reached by Azikiwe and federal Premier Abubakar Balewa, a soft-spoken Northerner: election results would be honored in the North, and another election would take place in the three Southern regions. In spite of the stress of the election, the federation has survived as a dignified nation which continues its experiment with political democracy.

² Unless specified, this and subsequent quotations are from the 1964 issues of *Afrique Nouvelle* and *West Africa*.

ECONOMIC GROUNDWORK

Without much fanfare, the ground was being laid for future economic prosperity in West Africa. Thus, such projects as a new deep water port in Dahomey, natural oil and a new dam in Nigeria, the giant Akosombo dam and the Tema aluminum plant in Ghana, the iron ore complex in Mauritania, and general agricultural diversification will soon make enormous contributions to economic development. Nonetheless, 1964 still saw most West African nations confronted with difficulties which jeopardized their development plans; in some cases, political leaders "sounded the alarm" to cope with short-term but serious problems.

President Léopold Senghor of Senegal, for example, said that his country "has its back against the wall and is in a combat situation."³ Sékou Touré of Guinea proclaimed, in November, 1964, a "veritable declaration of war . . . to save the economy of the nation." And in Ghana, an official document spoke of a forthcoming period of "trying economic development" while Nkrumah urged Ghanaians to enter "a more sober period, the period of the work-a-day routine of building national prosperity."

The most pressing economic problems may be classified into three rough categories. First is the uneven disbursement of public funds. This seems to have resulted from earlier optimism about the speed with which funds could be diverted from unproductive infrastructure into productive sectors, as well as from the intrusion of corruption and mismanagement of public funds. In Senegal, for instance, it was discovered at the end of 1962 that public investment lagged in production but was ahead in the administrative and social sectors. Consequently, the expected growth index of the national economy was reduced, beginning in 1964, from 148 to 131.

The second category concerns a decrease in production. For example, Guinea's agri-

culture has lagged since independence. Coffee production fell from 15,000 tons in 1959 to a mere 7,700 tons in 1962; President Sékou Touré complained in 1964 of a "vertiginous fall" in agricultural production. In Senegal, industrial production stagnated between 1961 and 1963, mostly as a result of the lost hinterland markets of Mali and Guinea.

A third problem area is that of commerce. With some exceptions, Africans have not found the incentive needed to man this sector of the economy. Foreign firms have left the countryside, and small middlemen are being eliminated by government-inspired peasant cooperatives. The present transition period is therefore marked by a lack of consumer goods available for purchase outside the cities.

Guinea illustrates another facet of the commercial problem, one of the most thorny with which the government has wrestled since independence. Before independence, the commercial sector was growing relatively fast.⁴ Since, the government experimented with state controls, then liberalized its policies when it appeared that they were not successful. By 1964, the situation had reached crisis proportions, and President Touré declared that his "patriotic appeals remained without echo" and that this "must change radically. . . ."

As in Mali, merchants are considered recalcitrant reactionaries since they show little taste for continuous sacrifice for the Republic. The inconvertibility of the Guinean franc (jokingly called "Sékoudo"), plus severe import restrictions on consumer goods, encourage widespread smuggling. According to Touré, "more than 60% of Guinea's internal commerce passed fraudulently outside the borders" in the six months following the liberalization of government controls. The government has therefore announced a new set of drastic controls.

Underlying these purely economic difficulties is a problem of attitude: the slow but steady erosion of post independence fervor. Having been told to ask what they can do for their new country, many Africans appear to ask first what they can do for themselves.

³ Léopold Senghor, *Planification et Tension Morale* (Dakar: Grande Imprimerie Africaine, 1963), p. 21.

⁴ See *AOF 1957* (Dakar: Haut Commissariat de la République en Afrique Occidentale Française, 1957), p. 363.

This loss of enthusiasm is widespread and serious, and at least one president has chided publicly those who appear to yearn for a return to colonial days.

Increasing apathy toward national goals is especially serious when it sweeps the ranks of the élite. Many civil servants find it difficult to renounce their visions of a soft life including many privileges—transformed into a birthright—and few duties. The time has gone, said one West African leader, when Samba could remain absent from work eight times a year to attend the funeral of his one grandmother, or when simple coffee breaks could be turned into elaborate discussion periods over mounds of pastry.

But this lack of commitment was not confined to the élite. Thus, Guinea's leaders reversed an earlier decision to decentralize the controlling *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* when they discovered that traditional lines of authority reasserted themselves at the expense of the party's goals. Touré, who prides himself on being an African revolutionary par excellence, had to call on his people to work for "the renovation and rehabilitation of the Guinean revolution."

The official "new look" emerging in West Africa is one of austerity. Government salaries are cut, the "rights" of civil servants curtailed, development plans readjusted. The movement which began with the satisfaction of ideal wants now has shifted to more prosaic material wants. The conquest of political power through independence has made room for the more arduous conquest of poverty. The problem is the maintenance of a sufficient degree of enthusiasm to sustain a long period of personal sacrifice, and of postponing some material advantages for the sake of society at the very time when material benefits grow larger around the corner.

UNITY IN WEST AFRICA

Three important trends concerning unity in West Africa emerged or continued in 1964. First, some politically inspired conflicts yielded to cooperation. One of these conflicts was the bitter dispute between Morocco and Mauritania, which had been a source of dis-


unity since 1957. The Moroccan government appears to have abandoned its former territorial claims over the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. During an official visit in Dakar, King Hassan of Morocco declared that "it is necessary to respect the will of the people who have chosen a régime" and, at the Cairo meeting of the O.A.U. in July, 1964, the delegates there from Mauritania and Morocco sat symbolically side by side for the first time.

Moreover, Mauritania began to entertain normal relations with Arab states. Agreements on cultural, technical, commercial, and consular cooperation were signed with Egypt and Tunisia. Then, in October, the United Arab Republic officially recognized the Mauritanian government. As a result of these developments, Mauritanian leaders have returned to their earlier theme of regarding their nation as a connecting link between "black" Africa and the Arab world.

Another area of improvement was that of Senegalo-Malian relations. Borders between the two countries were reopened two years after the Mali federal experiment was ended, and diplomatic relations were resumed. However, reciprocal trade has not reached its pre-1960 level, mostly because of the reorientation of Mali commerce. In addition, problems have arisen from the limited value of the Mali franc: Mali owes Senegal over one billion CFA francs for services rendered since the rapprochement. But the frequent bilateral conferences testify to both nations' goodwill in solving their differences.

Relations between Niger and Dahomey were an exception to this trend. A dispute arose after the Dahomean revolution in 1963, and was fed mainly by the present leaders' mutual fears of subversion and past political rivalries. Tensions have centered on three issues. The first was the expulsion of the bulk of Dahomean residents by the Niger government. In retaliation, Dahomey closed its border with Niger, thereby creating a second issue. This was a major blow to landlocked Niger since it depends on Dahomey for access to the sea. Finally, both countries pressed claims for possession of a tiny, eco-

FRENCH WEST AFRICA



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nominally unimportant island in the Niger River, Leté. This third issue quickly grew into a sensitive border conflict with troops "at the ready" near both borders.

Although the first two issues were settled, the entire argument became acute again in October, 1964, when Bakary's "raiders" stirred up trouble in Southern Niger. Efforts at mediation have so far remained without success. The end of the quarrel will have to wait for passions to cool, but it is not likely that Niger-Dahomey relations will ever be the same again under the present leadership.

THE O.A.U. AND THE U.A.M.

The second trend affecting unity was the creation of the Organization for African Unity (O.A.U.) and its consequences for the *Union Africaine et Malgache* (U.A.M.) which was the nucleus of the Monrovia group. Cohesion in the U.A.M. rested on the principle that the integrity of the new nations must be respected scrupulously and that, consequently, the path toward unity led to voluntary cooperation among sovereign equals. Since the O.A.U. subsequently incorporated that principle into its charter, it became increasingly difficult to maintain the U.A.M.

Had U.A.M. members been in agreement on its future, then it could have been salvaged until the O.A.U. was ready to take over its major functions. But the U.A.M. rapidly became the victim of the rivalry between Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Senegal, in need of export markets, championed the retention of the U.A.M.'s economic structures and led 10 of the 14 U.A.M. members in the creation of the *Union Africaine et Malgache de Coopération Economique* (U.A.M.C.E.), whereas the Ivory Coast, for whom the U.A.M. was less important economically, insisted that U.A.M. ties were primarily political and that it was "a considerable error to have created the UAMCE."

These differences were reinforced by political competition. The *coups d'état* in Togo and Dahomey brought to national leadership former associates of President Senghor of Senegal and thus tended to weaken Ivory Coast President Houphouet's position. These

changes altered the *status quo* on which Senegal-Ivoirien cooperation in the U.A.M. was based, and turned harmony into competition for political allies and economic clients.

Houphouet's reaction was to tighten the bonds among the three remaining members of the Entente (Niger, Upper Volta, and the Ivory Coast) and to seek closer cooperation with other nations under the banner of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (R.D.A.). Thus, a spectacular meeting took place at Bouaké, Ivory Coast, between the R.D.A. Presidents of Mali, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, and Niger. The final communiqué issued at the end announced measures to "assure better coordination of the activities of the government and parties... in the superior interest of their peoples and African unity."

REGIONAL COOPERATION

The third trend toward unity, perhaps potentially the most significant, was the growth of three types of regional projects for technical and economic cooperation. The first type is based on geographic contiguity, and includes the Senegal River Valley and the Senegal-Gambia ensemble. The Senegal River Valley project involves the collaboration of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, and Guinea.

Léopold Senghor had first advocated such a plan in 1956; this was, however, a political device to "balkanize" the former federation of French West Africa into two components to contain the spreading political influence of the Ivory Coast.

Senghor's recent initiative is motivated mainly by economic considerations. Since it is based upon objectives limited to specific mutual interests, the present project has good chance for success. Plans call for the

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Pointing out that "the importance of the Congo in international affairs has resulted in an endless stream of foreign pressure and interference . . .," these authors believe that "It is most improbable that the [Congo] countryside under rebel influence can be brought under any kind of control in the near future."

Rebellion in the Congo

By MARVIN D. MARKOWITZ AND HERBERT F. WEISS
Specialists on the Congo

EVER SINCE it achieved independence in June, 1960, the Congo has passed from crisis to crisis. 1964 was a particularly crucial year because, more than before, political conflict penetrated to the villages in many parts of the country. In effect, a revolutionary situation developed. This was in part due to the departure of the United Nations Force, which meant that conflicts between political factions were no longer restrained by an outside mediator. In addition, the Congo again became the focus of intense international maneuvers. The hard-won semblance of unity of independent African states at the Addis Ababa conference of 1963 was seriously compromised by dissension over the Congo. United States participation in the paratroop action at Stanleyville damaged its relations with many, if not most, African states. Chinese support of the Congo rebellion, even if materially almost insignificant, had a great impact on the balance of power in Africa.

The fundamental reasons for the many Congo crises since independence can perhaps be thought of in terms of four recurring problems. First, there is the repeated inability or unwillingness of Congolese leaders to agree among themselves, manifested in many different ways. Some leaders have tried to take their political fiefs out of the Congo in order to establish independent states; others have repeatedly demanded a greater share of political power than it was possible to give them

and, when disappointed, have flatly opposed the government in office. Secondly, none of the governments has been able to control the army effectively since the Force Publique mutinied five days after the declaration of independence. Thirdly, the absence of a competent civil service to replace the Belgians who left suddenly has prevented effective government even in those areas where there was no militant political opposition. Fourthly, the importance of the Congo in international affairs has resulted in an endless stream of foreign pressure and interference which has played its part in increasing tension.

These different elements have naturally interacted in different ways at different times. The first Congo government had to face a particularly heavy concentration of these problems. In one attempt to come to grips with the situation, the Congolese called for help from the United Nations which sent an international military force to the country. The presence of the United Nations Force dampened the violent encounters which were taking place between soldiers and the civilian population and between different political factions. Nonetheless, even while the United Nations Force was in the Congo, law and order and peace were never generally established. This was particularly true in the areas where secessionist movements had developed. Conflicts between northern and southern Katangans are estimated to have cost the lives of many tens of thousands, and

the situation in Kasai was probably just as bad.

During the first two years of independence, three major political poles emerged; the central government, in the hands of relatively moderate elements, a competitor regime in Stanleyville representing more radical elements and led by Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's successor, and the secessionist regimes of southern Katanga and southern Kasai. A great opportunity for national unity presented itself in July, 1961, when the Congo parliament reconvened under United Nations protection. A government was formed under Premier Cyrille Adoula, a highly regarded leader not too closely identified with any single political faction. His cabinet was very broadly based, including the leaders of the Stanleyville regime, and he had considerable support from the United Nations, the independent African states, the United States, and Belgium. Although the new government's auspicious start was marred by the unwillingness of Gizenga to maintain his initial support, it began to appear that a new page had been turned in the Congo's history.

But the greatest obstacle to a real solution of the crisis—both for the Congo and for the United Nations—lay in the continued secession of southern Katanga under Moise Tshombe's leadership. Adoula and the United Nations placed increasing but unsuccessful pressure on Katanga to rejoin the national fold. After many attempts at a negotiated settlement, the United Nations finally reunited the whole country by force in January, 1963.

With this major obstacle out of the way, the Adoula regime received a new lease on life. However, it continued to be thwarted by political defections, especially among members of parliament. This meant that Adoula became increasingly dependent on the support of the army, Congo President Joseph Kasavubu, and the United States. Also, he was faced with the United Nations persistent desire to withdraw its troops from the Congo. Since the United Nations Force was one of the foundation stones of his regime, this was a dire prospect. It was clear that unless the

central government could establish itself on a firmer basis, the departure of the United Nations Force would result either in a general breakdown of law and order or in a recurrence of secessions.

MOVES TOWARD STABILITY

Despite these obstacles, the Adoula regime made a very real effort to establish a stable and effective government. There were four especially important moves in this direction. First, an attempt was made to dampen some of the ethnic rivalries and antagonisms by creating 23 provinces out of the original 6. These new provinces for the most part reflected ethnically or politically homogeneous areas. While this move abated some ethnic and political conflicts, it was not wholly successful because in some instances new rivalries emerged. In addition, the proliferation of provincial governments and assemblies resulted in increased financial burdens on the already strained Congo budget.

Secondly, Adoula attempted to replace the parliamentary support he had lost by competing with parliamentary leaders at the grassroots level. He created a new political party, the *Rassemblement des Democrates Congolais* (R.A.D.E.C.O.) with local committees in most parts of the Congo. The party was based for the most part on government civil servants who had a vested interest in the continuation of the Adoula regime, and it was allegedly financed by the United States. R.A.D.E.C.O. proved unable to attract either the rural or the urban masses and failed to give Adoula a popular basis of support.

Thirdly, Adoula attempted to substitute African military aid for the departing United Nations Force. His especially cordial relations with Tunisia and Nigeria gave some initial prospect of success, but in the end both these countries were reluctant to make substantive commitments.

Fourthly, a new constitution was written because the mandate of the Congo parliament was drawing to a close, and the administration wanted to replace the Basic Law, which had been written by Belgium as a purely transitional instrument. Although the

manner in which this was done—without the agreement of parliament which had been rather arbitrarily sent on “vacation” by President Kasavubu—was legally questionable, the new constitution was submitted to a referendum and overwhelmingly approved. It was expected that this would pave the way for new elections which would reestablish a functioning parliamentary government.

But the star of the Adoula government continued to decline, largely because of a growing restiveness among the rural masses. During the struggle for independence, this segment of the population had been militant and radical; the rural masses had greatly contributed to Belgium's surrender of sovereignty. Still, the aftermath of independence was a tremendous disappointment. The white rulers had left, or had become the assistants of Congolese leaders, but the standard of living dropped drastically, the security of life and property disappeared in many parts of the country, and sporadic tribal wars broke out. Congolese political leaders frequently lived in ostentatious splendor, thriving on corruption and nepotism. The army became a *praetorian guard* renowned for injustices and arbitrary brutality. Under these circumstances, the initial reaction of the rural masses was one of passive withdrawal. Participation in political parties dropped to a zero point and, apart from relatively isolated eruptions of violence (or tribal wars), the mood in the villages reflected a stunned sense of betrayal.

But this rural passivity—which never covered the whole Congo—could not last for long. In addition to disappointed expectations and material hardships, a lawless desperation spread throughout much of the countryside. One of the manifestations of this general condition was the increase of religious movements and traditional African sects. In a word, the situation was ripe for revolution.

REVOLUTION BEGINS

Probably the most important event during the Adoula regime was an uprising in the Kwilu area of the former Leopoldville province—the beginning of this revolution. In

the fall of 1963, Pierre Mulele, a former minister under Patrice Lumumba and Antoine Gizenga, began to organize the untapped revolutionary potential of the rural masses among his kinsmen in this area. The “Kwilu Rebellion” was characterized by attacks not only against the representatives of the government, but also on virtually all aspects of Congolese life which had assimilated European culture. Thus not only district commissioners were attacked, but also the ordinary government clerks; not only the white missionaries, but also the Congolese priests. It was this peasant orientation which distinguished this outbreak from earlier conflicts which were generally confined to city politics and their extension into the countryside, or tribal warfare.

Comparisons have been rather loosely made between the goals and methods of this uprising and Chinese revolutionary doctrines. The fact that Mulele spent some time in China has given such comparisons a certain amount of credibility. However, as one commentator has pointed out, what has been occurring in the Congo is closer to the Boxer Rebellion than to the Chinese Revolution after World War II.

Initially, the Kwilu uprising was not taken very seriously in Leopoldville. Eventually, however, the need for determined action was felt by the Adoula regime, and a crack battalion of the Congo army was sent into the area. Since this pitted a force with the most modern weapons against villagers who for the most part had only bows and arrows and spears, the army scored a few spectacular victories. It managed to hold on to the key towns and to keep the roads open. But this limited success became the basis for gross overestimation—both in the Congo and abroad—of the army's effectiveness.

The second chapter of the revolution began when fighting spread to the eastern Congo. Although a Committee of National Liberation (C.N.L.) had established exile headquarters in Brazzaville and claimed to represent the revolutionary forces of Congolese nationalism, there is little evidence of effective control by its leaders over the uprising in

the Kwilu or in the east, or indeed of effective cooperation between the revolutionaries and the C.N.L. However, the uprising in the east was far more serious than that in the Kwilu, because it rapidly extended over a much larger area and because it had a common border with Burundi, which was sympathetic to some of its goals. In this instance, the army proved to be almost completely ineffectual and rapidly lost vast areas and several important towns.

Facing this debacle and the departure of the last of the United Nations Force, President Kasavubu demanded Adoula's resignation, and assumed virtually all government authority. Days of great political confusion followed. All major leaders participated in the negotiations over the formation of a new government, including the exiled Katangan leader, Moise Tshombe, and the leaders of the C.N.L. Although the details of the negotiations remain a mystery, it is evident that Tshombe was the most astute bidder for power. More than others, he succeeded in presenting himself as the last hope for national reconciliation—this despite the enormous handicap of having started off as the chief secessionist leader of the Congo. At any rate, to the astonishment of practically the whole world, Kasavubu named Tshombe as the Congo's new prime minister.

As one of his first acts, Tshombe declared a general amnesty, which included all those who ceased resisting the government. He also spectacularly liberated Gizenga. However, this did not end the uprisings and, in fact, Tshombe and the C.N.L. leaders never even came close to achieving an agreement. It is of course impossible to say what would have happened if a reconciliation of the leaders had in fact occurred, but there is good reason to believe that the uprising in the east had by this time achieved so great a revolutionary momentum that the leaders could no longer simply call it to a halt.

Tshombe now proceeded to name a small cabinet composed of intimate allies. At the same time, he embarked on a triumphal tour of the Congo, attempting to employ his personal magnetism as a rallying focus for grass-

roots support. In hard military terms, however, rather than reversing the unfavorable situation which he had inherited, his initial moves met with failure. A drastic deterioration followed. This was dramatically exemplified by the fall of Stanleyville only a few days after Tshombe had been acclaimed by the city's populace.

Consequently, Tshombe turned almost exclusively to military force, hiring white mercenaries, including Rhodesians, South Africans and various adventurers. He received increased military aid from the United States and Belgium. Fighter-bombers contributed by the United States and piloted by anti-Castro Cubans were particularly important, since they terrorized the rebels. This combination of power proved somewhat successful, and the Congo army-mercenary force recaptured many key towns. But, as in the Kwilu, the government troops tended to stick to the main lines of communication, leaving the countryside to the rebels.

Government victories were accompanied for the most part by acts of the most indiscriminate brutality and looting. Prisoners were either shot outright or tortured to death. Hardly any distinction appears to have been made between active rebel soldiers and the civilian population; troops entering towns and villages shot anything that moved. In their relations with the civilian population, discipline in the Congo army was often at a lower ebb than among the rebel soldiers, who demonstrated a degree of idealism and self-restraint.

Nonetheless, the rebels executed thousands of Congolese who were identified in their terms with the "old regime." These included persons working for the government or members of the more moderate political parties such as R.A.D.E.C.O., unfortunately a very large proportion of the educated élite in the areas under rebel control. Parallel to the rebel army, totally undisciplined bands of rebel "youth" emerged. Often these bands included ten-year-old children, who are reported to have been particularly cruel.

At the beginning of the uprising, the rebel leaders and the rebel army held attacks on

"whites" very much in check, though certain elements of the population, such as the youth gangs, demonstrated a profound and visceral antagonism toward whites. The leaders appear to have viewed the conflict essentially as a civil war and consequently treated whites more or less as neutrals. However, as the massive aid given to Tshombe began to pay off, and the white mercenaries and pilots turned the tide in the government's favor, the attitude of the leaders changed. Whites, especially Belgians and Americans, were subjected to increasing antagonism. The bombings and strafings which allegedly caused many casualties among ordinary villagers on the rebel side were particularly resented.

HOSTILITY AND HOSTAGES

Knowing that continued military aid to the Tshombe regime would mean the defeat of the uprising, the rebel leaders desperately sought to obtain the departure of the white mercenaries and pilots. However, they were in no position to bargain. On the ground, they were losing, and in the diplomatic arena they had almost no support. Out of this desperate predicament they conceived the idea of making the whites in their territory hostages. By becoming hostages, some of the whites obtained slightly better treatment, since the leaders made a special effort to protect them from youth gangs in the hope of exchanging them for political gain. But at the same time, the stresses of the situation made the populace increasingly antiwhite, while the control which the leaders had over their followers became more tentative. These developments naturally made the position of the hostages most precarious.

With their nationals as hostages in rebel-held territory, the Belgian and United States governments faced an agonizing choice. They felt that they could not abandon their citizens. Yet they were reluctant to press for a halt of the advance on Stanleyville, and it is questionable whether Tshombe would have been responsive to such pressure. Still, with every government victory, the lives of the hostages were increasingly threatened. It was in response to this dilemma that the plan


for a Belgian-American air drop on Stanleyville was first conceived. An additional political motivation was the conviction, very generally held in Brussels and in Washington, that the fall of Stanleyville would mean the collapse of the rebellion.

The situation was further complicated by the involvement of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.), which was seeking a negotiated settlement to the whole Congo problem. Consequently, before launching the attack, the United States agreed to meet a rebel representative in Nairobi under Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta's sponsorship. By the time the meeting took place, plans for the attack were being implemented; after only one meeting, the United States broke off the negotiations and, with Belgium, launched the attack. Part of the reason for this hasty action was the fact that Congolese army-mercenary columns were already within striking distance of Stanleyville and the lives of the hostages were therefore feared to be in immediate jeopardy.

The attack on Stanleyville encountered considerable resistance, although from a military point of view it was a complete success. True to the warning previously given by the rebel radio, hostages were shot once the attack began. But these killings appear to have resulted from panic rather than in execution of precise orders. Because of the fast action of the Belgium paratroopers, there were only about 100 casualties, with approximately 1500 whites evacuated from the city.

Both local resistance and negative international reaction to the Stanleyville attack were far stronger than had been anticipated; more importantly, the attack failed to bring about the expected collapse of the rebellion. This raised a second agonizing question: what would happen to the 900 whites who were scattered in small centers or missions within rebel-held territory? Obviously, they were now in grave danger. Interestingly enough, although a number were killed in reaction to the Stanleyville attack, the vast majority was left unharmed.

International repercussions were very serious. Most Africans were especially offended.



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First of all, they felt that the United States had broken off the Nairobi negotiations under Kenyatta's sponsorship in a cavalier manner. Second, they deplored the total lack of Western concern for the death of numerous Africans during the rescue operations. Third, they were upset by the spectacle of Western military intervention in an African civil war upon the formal request of Moïse Tshombe, considered by many to be a traitor to African nationalism. Given this atmosphere of resentment and shock, the more radical African states seized the opportunity to give open support to the rebels, while Tshombe became more isolated than ever.

In the aftermath of the most recent upheavals, two conclusions can be drawn. At the grass-roots level, in the vast areas touched

by the rebellion, the fall of Stanleyville and the scattering of the rebel leadership has resulted in heightened revolutionary activity without any effective direction. It is most

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"It has taken over a year of patient, gradual negotiation to integrate the diverse institutions and policies which are now the responsibility of the Union government," writes this on-the-scene observer who notes that "the process is not yet fully completed."

Tanzania: Myth and Reality

By LIONEL CLIFFE

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THE MONTHS since the beginning of 1964 have been eventful in this part of the world. There has been a successful revolution in Zanzibar, and an abortive army mutiny in Tanganyika which had repercussions throughout East Africa. In April, a new state came into being, and since then the slow process of building a new nation has continued. Tanganyika's image, as seen in the West, has undergone a marked change—as much a result of change in the way the West has viewed the country as from changes in what there has been to view.

Indeed, perhaps most striking is the contrast between the view of the resident and the lurid over-anxious reporting that gives the world its view of Tanzania. There has been a tendency to play up particular events without viewing country-wide developments in overall perspective. That certain developments—the mutiny, the expulsion of two American diplomats, the discovery of a United States "plot" against the present government, among others—have been startling and in some cases disturbing is undeniable. But to arrive at a balanced and sympathetic view, these incidents must be set into context.

This part of East Africa, hitherto quietly ignored because of its seemingly confident stability, began to hit the world headlines as

a potential international trouble spot at the time of the Zanzibar revolution in January, 1964. The overthrow of the predominantly Arab ruling party could almost have been foreseen. Zanzibar, which had gained its political independence from British "protection" in December, 1963, consists of two small islands, some 50 miles from Dar es Salaam, the capital of what was Tanganyika. Their combined population is on the order of Little Rock, Arkansas, or Chattanooga, Tennessee—a fact which helps to put events there in some perspective. Perhaps 15 per cent of the population were Arabs who, together with the few thousand Asian¹ businessmen and shopkeepers, dominated the simple island economy. The rest of the population was almost equally made up of indigenous, or at least pre-Arab, people known as "Shirazis," and more recent arrivals from the mainland who were referred to as "Africans."

A series of fairly inconclusive elections had given the Zanzibar Nationalist party (Z.N.P.) precarious control of the government of the new state, while its opponents, the Afro-Shirazi party, had a majority of the total popular vote. This left a very tense situation, with the Z.N.P. government keeping a wary eye on Afro-Shirazi leaders such as Abeid Karume and Othman Shariff—and on another potential "trouble maker," Sheikh Abdulrahman Babu, a former Z.N.P. general secretary who had left the party and was

¹ The term "Asian" in East Africa refers to a person of Indian or Pakistani origin.

leading his own radical group, the Umma party. Suddenly, with Babu boating in Dar es Salaam harbor and the government busy watching the equally innocent activities of the leaders of the Afro-Shirazi party, a handful of young party supporters brought off a coup against the government. Many of them were first-generation immigrants from the mainland, and seem to have acted without disclosing details of their plans to the leaders of their own party.

There was a certain amount of bloodshed during this January take-over—how much is still hard to determine—but peace, if not order, was restored within a week. The importance of the Zanzibar uprising lay in its political consequences, rather than in the event itself. For this was not merely a coup by a handful of ambitious party activists too impatient to wait for the next election, but a real social revolution under the Afro-Shirazi party.

This has had marked consequences for internal social and economic policy and in the realm of foreign affairs. Many of the economic institutions that existed have been taken over by the new government—the clove and coconut plantations, the docks, the Electricity Board. A number of publicly sponsored development projects are under way, mainly in the fields of agriculture and welfare. The most publicized have been financed (and to some extent staffed) by East Germans, but many other countries, including the United States, have backed projects. However, the most noticeable changes on the island are in the attitudes of the people. Formerly, Zanzibar gave the impression of being the sleepiest place in the Indian Ocean, but a revolutionary fervor is now very evident. Self-help schemes have been part of the pattern of life in mainland Tanzania for some time, but there they are not able to command turnouts of ten to fifteen thousand persons at a time as they do on the island.

This kind of social zeal is partly a result of the commitment of some of Zanzibar's leaders to socialist ideology, but in part also it is an inevitable result of the revolution against Arab domination of the economic

and social life of the islands. Dedicated to weakening the Arab and, to some extent, Asian landowners and entrepreneurs, the only way for the government to "Africanize" is through cooperative and state enterprises.

It was perhaps also inevitable that the new regime should turn more to the East, especially because the British colonial authorities, and (through guilt by association) the West generally, were identified, at least in the Afro-Shirazi propaganda, with the former Arab ruling class. But the fact that the West delayed recognition of the new government until East German support of the economy and administration had become indispensable left the revolutionary regime little choice in its foreign relations. Small wonder, then, that Zanzibar has been reluctant to give in to West German demands that, as part of Tanzania, it end its official contacts with the only country to extend an immediate helping hand.

THE EAST AFRICAN MUTINIES

Before taking up the wider theme of Tanzania's foreign relations, we must first look at the implications of the outbreak of violence on the Tanganyika mainland. On the night of January 19, soldiers of the First Battalion of the 600-strong Tanganyika Rifles mutinied against their British officers and assumed control of the armed forces and strategic points of the capital including State House. President Julius Nyerere was able to escape from his residence and remained under cover for a couple of days until things more or less returned to normal.

Speculation naturally linked these events with the previous week's coup in Zanzibar, but it now seems evident that there was no coordinated "plot." However, the soldiers might have been influenced by the successful coup in Zanzibar to think that they could redress their grievances and get rid of their foreign commanders by taking things into their own hands, just as this infectious resort to violence spread later from Tanganyika to troops in Kenya and Uganda.

Again, it was the consequences that were important. The irresponsible action of 20 or

30 soldiers put the security of the whole state in jeopardy and did inestimable harm to the country's image of stability. This was also a great blow to the self-confidence of the country's leaders, and many people realized for the first time just how precarious the security and stability of the new state were. As a result, Tanzanians, particularly party activists and local officials, have become very security conscious, seeing everything as a threat to the nation. Security can be tightened, but to improve Tanzania's image abroad will take a long time. People who read only the headlines will not be easily convinced that Tanzania is stable. This is having a serious effect on the economy. For instance, the tourist trade, which had been growing at a very rapid rate, slumped by 16 per cent in 1964. It was unfortunate, too, that the mutiny occurred at a time when the very ambitious Five-Year Plan was about to be published.

THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

At this point, in considering the problems of development, Tanzania's foreign policy relates directly to events within the country. A country at this pre-take-off economic level must rely to a large extent on foreign capital. Indeed, half of the estimated \$700 million investment called for in the Plan will have to be financed from outside sources. The availability of this "life-blood" will depend to some extent on the world's views of Tanzania. So far, despite the fact that Western countries have cooled off slightly in their admiration for the country, a substantial proportion of these capital needs have already been promised. This probably reflects two factors: first of all, Western aid has rarely been given on grounds of merit; the cynics might even suggest that disturbances and even a slight "pink" tinge are prerequisites for an injection of this "life-blood." The other trend was Tanzania's deliberate decision to become more neutral and to seek aid from Eastern countries instead of entirely from the West, as before. This was probably an economic necessity if the country was to find all the funds, and it has certainly paid

off. Two-fifths of the government's needs—\$84 million—has already been guaranteed by China and Russia.

NEUTRALIST POLICIES

During the last year or so, Tanzania has been taking a more clearly neutralist position in its foreign relations than the old Tanganyika. Relatively speaking, of course, any move to loosen the very close ties with the West can be interpreted as a move towards the Eastern bloc, but whatever the direction of this change of emphasis in foreign policy, Tanzania has still not reached the halfway mark. Western sources still provide most of the foreign assistance; the new generation of leaders is being trained in a Western style university college; more than half of the country's trade is still with Britain and Europe. But now people are *conscious* of their great reliance on the West and to some extent resent it.

This resentment dates back in some measure to the mutiny, and to the fact that the government had to call in British commandos to quell the mutineers. At the time it was unthinkable that any other troops—Russian or Chinese or even Indian—might be called upon but today this would not be quite so natural a reaction. The deliberately overt presence of British troops in the capital was an indignity that the people of Tanganyika had not suffered even during the 40 years of British colonial rule. The African people certainly did not regard them as liberators—and the fact that they were treated as liberators by the British, and to some extent by the whole white community, only worsened matters.

Awareness of close dependence on the West has also grown because pressures have been exerted recently—perhaps for the first time. Pressure has been put on partly because of Dar es Salaam's growing importance as the center of the liberation movement in Africa. Dar es Salaam is the home of most of the southern African refugee political parties, and more recently of the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity. As the policies of these groups have

become more militant and the possibility of action has grown, especially in neighboring Mozambique, Tanzania has taken on more international significance—and naturally, it has been subject to more diplomatic pressures.

Western pressures have also been exerted as Western powers have seen what they tended to regard as Communist influence spreading under the aegis of the left-wing Zanzibar ministers, notably Babu, in the Union cabinet. "Counseling" about these "dangers," and suggestions to "play it cool" in Mozambique and the liberation struggle, have evoked a hostile reaction. The government has resented unasked-for "advice," and the heavy-handedness of some of this diplomacy has even on occasions made the President lose his habitual calm. In consequence, Tanzania has usually continued on the course which has been criticized, and this confirms the Western obsession that the country is moving dangerously to the left.

United States policy in other parts of Africa, notably the Congo (about which people feel very strongly) and in some other parts of the world, such as Vietnam, have certainly not strengthened relations. The Tanzanians read what irresponsible observers say about Tanzania and the possibility of "Communist subversion." They hear the Portuguese demanding NATO help to combat this same "Communist subversion" in the guise of Tanzania-based Mozambique freedom-fighters. And they worry about their own security. The self-confidence of a newly-independent, not politically sophisticated people is not great, and in Tanzania it was recently shaken during the mutiny. Tanzanians know that the security of their state is precarious. Finally, the fact that they have to risk this security, as they see it, because their economy needs foreign, mainly Western, experts only adds to their suspicion of the West.

This sort of attitude underlies recent events: This is why the people of Tanzania are ready to shout "foreign plot" and to expel foreigners on the slightest suspicion. The basic truth is that a situation has been reached

where the people of Tanzania and their government are frightened of the United States. Calming these fears will be a long task requiring patience—not just a little more aid—and a greater understanding of the realities of Tanzania's position than in the past.

THE UNION

What are the realities of Tanzanian politics? The first factor about which there is considerable confusion and misunderstanding is the year-old Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The event was misinterpreted at the time. When Presidents Nyerere and Karume suddenly announced their intention to unite their countries and signed the Act of Union a few days later, this was generally interpreted as a clever and sudden maneuver to oust Communist influence—both East German and home-grown Zanzibari. In fact, the first overtures for union had come from Zanzibar within a week of their successful revolution three months before. Nor was this so surprising. The Afro-Shirazi party always looked up to TANU (the Tanganyika African National Union) as an older brother and many residents of the island, especially the revolutionaries themselves, regarded themselves as Tanganyikans. While overseas observers speculated as to whether Babu and other Zanzibar leftists would go into exile or start an opposition, I saw them celebrating Union dancing wildly, tears of joy streaming down their faces, arm in arm with some of the Tanganyika leaders.

Other misunderstandings have arisen because of the nature of the union. Although the Union government is responsible for all matters affecting Tanganyika, Zanzibar retains a government of its own and has considerable autonomy.

In addition, great concern has been expressed, by everyone except President Nyerere, because Zanzibar has continued to deal with matters which, under the Act of Union, should have been reserved to the Tanzanian government. This has been particularly true of foreign affairs, the most quoted example being that of the East Germans who

continued to have an "embassy" in Zanzibar for months after a decision to relegate all Zanzibar missions to consulates with embassies in Dar es Salaam.

Yet, as President Nyerere has stated more than once, this is basically a German, not a Tanzanian, problem. If it were not for the Federal Republic's Halstein Doctrine which forces countries to choose which Germany to recognize diplomatically there would be no problem. The problem was made worse by similar East German blackmail because Zanzibar had come to depend on East Germany. Nyerere's "weakness" in not immediately tackling this problem has now in fact led to a diplomatic triumph. The Germans (both) have compromised and Tanzania is now the only country outside the Soviet Union with official representation of both East and West Germany.

The tactic of not being forced into difficult decisions, which was interpreted as a lack of control, has in fact paid off almost all along the line. Cooperation between Tanganyika and Zanzibar has been growing; the police force is now integrated; as is the conduct of foreign relations. Union officials have played a large part in preparing a Development Plan for Zanzibar and President Nyerere has proved his popularity on both the islands with a highly successful state visit. Previous "difficulties" can best be understood by thinking of the Act of Union as a statement of intention. It has taken over a year of patient, gradual negotiation to integrate the diverse institutions and policies which are now the responsibility of the Union government, and the process is not yet fully completed. Confusion has arisen because the countries became officially one and this heralded the start of the second more practical step. But what really is remarkable is that this step has been taken and a single state has been created out of two countries who were proximate but had only the desire for unity in common.

Part of the explanation for some of the seemingly strange actions of the Tanzanians has been the suggestion that there are splits in the leadership and virtual loss of control

by the President. That there should be some disagreement among government leaders is inevitable, especially when there are representatives of two formerly independent countries. But a remarkable feature of the Tanzanian set-up is that although differences may arise over specific issues, there is little evidence that factions pursue consistently different "lines." Further, the members of the Cabinet have a common admiration and personal affection for President Julius Nyerere. This is particularly so in the case of External Affairs Minister Oscar Kambona who many would like to brand as the villain. The President's own pragmatic approach halts any tendency toward division; on one occasion he may be urging caution on his colleagues, the next suggesting something that would please the most radical.

His popularity and effective control faltered a little when he disappeared at the time of the mutiny. But since then he has adequately recovered his position. One marked feature of recent constitutional changes has been a tendency for power to be consolidated in his own hands—the more remarkable in view of his previous tendency to delegate. On the formation of the Union government he took over direct control of economic planning. Further, in August of 1964, he brought under his own office Central Establishments (i.e., the appointing of civil servants) and the key area of Regional Administration—the machine through which the different parts of the country are governed.

Nyerere's popularity upcountry remains unchallenged and, in fact, it is an important catalyst for development. He has been making frequent safaris to the different regions and one fascinating by-product of these excursions is the amount of work that goes into preparations for his arrival. Not in

(Continued on page 242)

Lionel Cliffe, before joining the staff at Kivukoni College in Dar es Salaam, was Information and Research Assistant for the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief and an Oxford (England) City Councilor.

Country	Former name or status	Premier, president, or king	Date of independence
Algeria	Comprised three departments of France	Ahmed ben Bella	July 3, 1962
Burundi	(1) Part of Belgian Congo	Albin Nyamoya	June 30, 1962
Cameroun	(2)	Ahmàdou Ahidjo	Jan. 1, 1960
Central African Republic	FOFEA (3)	David Dacko	Aug. 13, 1960
Chad	FOFEA	François Tombalbaye	Aug. 8, 1960
Congo (Brazzaville)	FOFEA	Pascal Lissouba	Aug. 15, 1960
Congo (Leopoldville)	Belgian Congo	Moïse Tshombe	June 30, 1960
Dahomey	FWA (4)	J. T. Ahomadegbe	Aug. 1, 1960
Ethiopia	Also known as Abyssinia	Emperor Haile Selassie	11th Century B.C.
Gabon	FOFEA	Leon M'bâ	Aug. 17, 1960
Gambia	British colony	David K. Jawara	Feb. 18, 1965
Ghana	Gold Coast (British colony)	Kwame Nkrumah	March 6, 1957
Guinea	FWA	Sekou Touré	Oct. 2, 1958
Ivory Coast	FWA	F. Houphouet-Boigny	Aug. 7, 1960
Kenya	British colony	Jomo Kenyatta	Dec. 12, 1963
Liberia		V. S. Tubman	July 26, 1847
Libya	Italian colony	King Idris I	Dec. 24, 1951
Madagascar	Madagascar (French colony)	Philibert Tsiranana	June 26, 1960
Malawi	Nyasaland (British colony)	Kamuzu Banda	July 6, 1964
Mali	French Sudan (FWA)	Modibo Keita	Sept. 22, 1960
Mauritania	FWA	Moktar Ould Daddah	Nov. 28, 1960
Morocco	French protectorate	King Hassan II	March 2, 1956
Niger	FWA	Hamani Diori	Aug. 3, 1960
Nigeria	British colony	Abubakar T. Balewa	Oct. 1, 1960
Rwanda	(1)	Gregoire Kayibanda	June 30, 1962
Senegal	FWA	L. S. Senghor	Aug. 20, 1960
Sierra Leone	British colony	Albert Morgai	April 27, 1961
Somalia	(5)	Abdi Rashid Shermarke	July 1, 1960
South Africa		Hendrick F. Verwoerd	May 31, 1910 (7)
Sudan	Anglo-Egyptian Sudan	Sir al-Khâtem al-Khalifa	Jan. 1, 1956
Tanzania	(6)	Julius Nyerere	(6)
Togo	UN trust territory of Togoland	Nicolas Grunitzky	April 27, 1960
Tunisia	French protectorate	Habib Bourguiba	March 20, 1955
Uganda	British colony	Milton Obote	Oct. 9, 1962
United Arab Republic	Egypt	Gamal Abdel Nassar	Feb. 28, 1922
Upper Volta	FWA	Maurice Yameogo	Aug. 5, 1960
Zambia	Northern Rhodesia (British colony)	Kenneth Kaunda	Oct. 10, 1964

(1) Part of Belgian-administered UN trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi.

(2) Combination of UN trust territories formerly under British and French administration.

(3) Part of Federation of French Equatorial Africa.

(4) Part of French West Africa.

(5) Made up of former Italian and British Somaliland.

(6) Tanzania is made up of the UN trust territory of Tanganyika, which became independent of British administration Dec. 9, 1961, and Zanzibar, which became independent of Britain Dec. 10, 1963. They merged April 26, 1964, and changed their name to Tanzania Oct. 29, 1964.

(7) Became republic May 31, 1961.

The Nations of Africa



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KEY: At the beginning of this century Liberia and Ethiopia were the only independent countries in Africa. In 1965, only the areas in black are not independent. For information about the independent nations of Africa see the chart on page 224.

In spite of its continued prosperity and lack of concern for world opinion and threat, this writer observes that the government of South Africa has been troubled "during these past two years [by] internal terror, labeled either as treason or sabotage." Trials on these charges, he continues, "have revealed the highly significant fact that Europeans are involved with Africans in plotting against the government" and also that the government will deal with this threat "by counterforce."

The Republic of South Africa

By COLIN RHYS LOVELL
Professor of History, University of Southern California

AS THE REST of Africa has been convulsed, the mood of the ruling class in the Republic of South Africa has changed: No more explanations, no more apologia, no more conciliation; instead, the fortress will be held, by whatever means. The plan of the members of the Organization of African Unity, worked out at the Addis Ababa conference of May, 1963, to utilize the United Nations and its agencies to deal with the situation, has merely solidified South African European support behind the government.

These African plans for the United Nations have also encountered American and British reluctance to utilize the organization for ultimate pressures upon South Africa. When the Afro-Asian block proposed the expulsion of South Africa from UNESCO, American Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson deplored the effort as in the end hurting only Africans in the Republic. The response of South Africa to an ultimatum delivered by the Afro-Asians at the International Labor Organization conference at Geneva in June, 1963, was to withdraw from that body. When the African delegates left the floor of the World Health Organization as the South African representative rose to speak, the South African government instructed its delegate to do likewise, although

Prime Minister Henrik Verwoerd emphasized that the action did not mean the Republic's departure from WHO.

During 1963 and 1964 a steady drum fire of committees, resolutions, and recommendations emanated from the General Assembly and Security Council relative to South African racial policies. The attitude of the Verwoerd government was that these matters were internal affairs and, as such, beyond the proper competence of the United Nations. Although Canada and the United States, in conformity with a Security Council recommendation of July, 1963, ended arms and military vehicle deliveries to South Africa, proposals to isolate the Republic completely encountered American and British resistance.

The need of the United States for the South African satellite tracking stations, and the dependence of the United Kingdom upon Simonstown for naval operations caused both countries to hesitate. When in October, 1964, the new British Labor government announced cancellation of a contract to supply South Africa with Buccaneer low level bombers, Verwoerd responded immediately and toughly in a threat to dispossess the Royal Navy of its Simonstown station. The British government announced the delivery of the planes. About the only tangible result from international pressure was the exclusion of

South African athletes from the Tokyo Olympic Games—this because the South African Athletic Association, despite its fielding a multi-racial team, would not give a pledge against apartheid in South African sports.

THREAT OF EMBARGO

The only threat from the United Nations which seriously concerned the Verwoerd ministry was that of an embargo on petroleum. Verwoerd admitted in May, 1963, that a petroleum embargo would cause serious problems. Anticipating the worst, the government launched a crash program for oil prospecting within South Africa. Dr. Francis Herson, formerly of Iraq Petroleum, was hired to direct the program, which involved granting eleven oil prospecting leases on very generous terms. Early in 1965 the government appropriated \$21 million for petroleum search, \$14 million of this going to a single company of a public corporation type. However, the threatened embargo on petroleum never came to pass, and the broader threats of a boycott on South African export goods ran into hard facts.

During 1964 exports to the rest of Africa from the Republic increased over \$16 million, those to Europe by twelve per cent, and to the United States by over six per cent, with overall exports rising by over ten per cent. Although the bulk of the exports were minerals, particularly the traditional one of gold, a good part of the general increase stemmed from the Japanese trade treaty. In 1963 Japanese exports to South Africa rose by a third; and imports into Japan from South Africa were up by fifteen per cent, making Japan following only after the United Kingdom, the United States, and Southern Rhodesia as a South African customer. Foreign investment flowed into the Republic unabated, with sixty per cent from the United Kingdom and eleven per cent from the United States. These and other figures justified the declaration by the British Council of Churches in late 1963 that a boycott of South African products just was not practical.

In contrast to the futility of threats in the

United Nations about boycotts, was the effective damper placed by it upon the government's plans for Southwest Africa, where the Odendaal Commission had recommended both large-scale development and the introduction of territorial apartheid. British and American warnings that the implementation of these latter plans would produce direct United Nations intervention caused the Verwoerd government to nibble only at the development plans in irrigation, agriculture, and education in 1964. Meanwhile, South Africa prepared to argue its right to retain Southwest Africa before the International Court in March, 1965, and was studiously silent on its possible action should the tribunal decide adversely.

A BUFFER RING

In addition, the government looked to the establishment of a buffer ring to its north. Prime Minister Verwoerd put out hints during 1963 and 1964 of a multi-racial economic zone in southern Africa. More significantly, he held very private talks in Cape Town with Premier Ian Smith of Rhodesia in March, 1964. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hilgard Muller, traveled to Portugal to sign a convention on allocation of water between Southwest Africa and Angola, on Lourenço Marques port facilities and on "other matters of mutual concern."

However, if Ian Smith looked to the Republic of South Africa, so also did Prime Minister Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, who announced that Africans from his country working in South Africa, chiefly in the mines, were subject to its laws. Premier Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia did not join in the Afro-Asian chorus for sanctions against the Republic. Seretse Khama of Bechuanaland put the matter bluntly in explaining why his country could not participate in a boycott, "Trade with South Africa is our life blood." Thus the Congo might boil and the South African government lend near open encouragement to the recruitment of European mercenaries in the Republic by Moise Tshombe, but the immediate border states on the north did not indicate that they were

staging areas for an invasion from "black" Africa.

If such an invasion should come, South Africa keeps an erect military posture. The budgetary outlay for defense was jumped to \$294 million for 1964-1965 in order to increase the permanent force from 9,000 to 12,000 men. The hitherto easy-going conscription system, which previously trained 2,000 men annually, will now jump this figure to 16,000. Even more important, the South African defense establishment out-distances in technological efficiency that of any other African state, including a small but efficient navy of destroyers and mine sweepers, something quite unique for the entire continent.

Behind this self-assurance and determination is a nation still enjoying soaring prosperity. In 1964, part of this prosperity rubbed off on the African mine workers, when the government announced a ten per cent pay raise across the board for them. So confident was the government that in 1963 it launched its thirty-year Orange River Development Project, calling for the outlay of \$360 million to irrigate 760 million acres and generate 177,000 kilowatts. Proudly announcing that this project would not require any foreign financing, the government also announced that the goal of the project was the creation of a "white heartland" which would be "virtually invulnerable" and would absorb 9,000 farm immigrants. Although not all in this particular category, immigrants vastly outnumbered emigrants during 1964, while the latter actually declined by fifty per cent under the levels of 1962-1963. A considerable number of immigrants were Europeans from newly Africanized states, and these people have helped underwrite the general European attitude in South Africa that "it shall not happen here."

BANTUSTAN SOLUTION


The government insisted that its Bantustan solution (the proposal for Bantu self-government) would do just this, although the United Party Opposition insisted that Bantustans would merely offer a sounding board

for Communist agitation. The first year of operation of the first Bantustan—"independent" Transkei—complete with flag and national anthem, did not indicate this danger; but neither did it show a complete success. In the territory's first elections in 1963, Premier Kaiser Mantanzina, the Republic's choice, won only twelve of the 45 elected seats; the others went to Chief Victor Poto, who stressed multi-racialism as opposed to separate development. Only the support of the ex-officio members, largely government-nominated chiefs, has kept Mantanzina in office.

Although promising a complete Africanizing of the Transkei, to date the Premier has been able only to deprive Europeans in the territory of their liquor licenses. The necessity of approval by the Republic government of all legislation by the Transkei parliament, even in its limited fields of competence, has embarrassed Mantanzina. The economic weakness of the Transkei has not been met, and the South African government obviously wishes to get out from under its heavy financial commitments for territorial development. In September, 1964, the Republic's Finance Minister, T. E. Dönges, asked for an International Development Association loan from the World Bank for the Transkei and was noncommittal as to whether the Republic would guarantee its repayment.

Despite this queasy situation in the Transkei, the Pretoria government, although having to delay the Odendaal plan for Southwest Africa, announced its second Bantustan for Tswanaland in the northern Cape Province. It would embrace nearly two million people and have its capital at Mafeking once serving that function for the British High Commission Territory of Bechuanaland. Again, the government made heavy financial commitments for the new territory.

Any large-scale implementation of Bantustan plans caused the Republic to look longingly on Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland. In 1963, Verwoerd offered them a Bantustan status if they would associate themselves with the Republic. The three British territories, however, have been moving



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SOUTHWEST AFRICA

in the direction of outright independence, with a target date of 1965. Threats by the Republic to isolate them have little meaning since they provide half of the foreign labor in the Republic—notably in the mines, but also in agriculture. The realities simply are that neither the territories nor the Republic can coerce each other.

Unlike in the Transkei, the governments proposed for the territories are modeled along British parliamentary lines. Formal political parties exist only in Basutoland, and are largely the personal followings of Ntsu Mokhehle and Seth Makotako, with Chief Motlotlehi Moshoeshoe II using his vast prestige to modify the plans of both. None of these leaders are "anti-South Africa," recognizing the facts of life; but none has indicated

acceptance of the Verwoerd Bantustan proposal.

In Swaziland, John J. Nquku and Ambrose Zwane perform the same function with the same attitude, although Swaziland is further distant from full self-government than Basutoland. Interestingly, in both territories former South Africans, such as Walter Sanford, Dennis Cowen, and Lester Rudin—all of whom left the Republic for posts abroad—have been influential in planning future governmental structures. However, Swaziland has also produced the frankly tribal Mbandzeni party and the technique of political assassination, the most notable example being that of J. C. Martin, Secretary for Finance and Development, who was shot on the steps of his home.

Least partisan and most peaceful has been Bechuanaland, which has been embarrassed at times by the presence of political refugees from the Republic. One party of 150 fleeing from Southwest Africa was permitted, but the Bechuanaland regime is determined to have "correct," if not warm, relations with the Republic. Personalities again loom larger than parties, with Seretse Khama having great prestige, and therefore also his Bechuanan Democratic party. Motsami Mpko, a refugee from South Africa, heads up the somewhat more pan-African Bechuanaland Peoples' party. Neither leader, however, has made gestures toward African parties in either South Africa or Southern Rhodesia. Indications are for a Khama victory in the 1965 elections. But whatever group wins, the main problems for Bechuanaland will remain economic. The 4,000 Europeans in the territory appear to be willing to remain, but the 1964 budget called for nearly half of the \$11 million budget to come from a British grant. This technique is unlikely to be available after independence—no matter who wins the election or whether the capital remains at Lobatsi, or shifts, as proposed, to Gaberones.

APARTHEID CONTINUES

The hard economic facts will tie the three territories to South Africa, whatever their political status. For South Africa too, the territories are a fact, but with the additional facet that they are now providing refuge for those opposing Pretoria's racial policy. The 1964 Bantu Laws Amendment Act, opposed only by Helen Suzman, the lone Progressive party member in Parliament, adds still another layer to the high wall of racial regulation. The 7 million Bantu in European cities and farms will be assigned to zones, with movement permitted only by government action, which can also deport to a Bantu reserve any African who is "idle or undesirable." The legislation may also indicate that Pretoria does not envisage, as once, the location of all Bantu in Bantustans.

The refinement of apartheid as regards the Colored (mixed) population, has come with the Colored Persons Representative Council,

elected by all Coloreds in South Africa, to serve as a link between the government and the Colored community. With its powers almost entirely advisory, the Council may repeat the tale of the feckless Native Representation Council of 1936. However, the government may delegate certain legislative powers to it, and T. R. Swartz, leader of the new Federal Coloured People's party, has announced that its aim for Coloreds is equal rights in the land of their birth within the framework of separate development, which can mean almost anything—or nothing.

INTERNAL TERROR

For the government, however, the chief problem during the past two years has been internal terror, labeled either as treason or sabotage. A series of trials on these charges during the past two years have revealed the highly significant fact that Europeans are involved with Africans in plotting against the government. A few Coloreds, but no Asiatics, have been implicated. The Verwoerd ministry has chosen to deal with the problem, which is much more of a danger than any vague threat of external invasion, by counterforce. The "Rivonia" trials, so-called because of the location at which the evidence was uncovered, held at Pretoria in 1964, engaged the attention of the world. The South African government took the position that these were not "political" trials, but criminal, with murder the charge. United Nations attempted intervention was countered with a rebuke for interference in matters *sub judice*. Nelson Mandela, the "Black Pimpernel" who had spirited refugees out of the Republic, Walter Sisulu, and also Dennis Goldberg were imprisoned for life. Others received long sentences. The government's refusal to yield on the sentences received the support of the United party, whose leader called the verdicts and sentences, "right, just, and necessary."

The trial, however, did not deter sabotage. Dynamiting in the Western Cape and Pretoria was aimed at knocking out electrical and communication systems. On July 25,

1964, the editor of the pro-government *Die Transvaaler* received a telephone call from the banned African Resistance Movement that the Johannesburg railway station was to be bombed at the peak of the rush hour in the afternoon. Even as the call was made, the time bomb exploded in the European waiting room (and at the same time five shots were fired from a speeding car into the office of the Opposition *Rand Daily Mail!*). Twenty persons were injured, one a 77-year old woman, who died. One of the plotters, Dennis Higgs, fled to Lusaka, in what was then still Northern Rhodesia, but now Zambia. Self-appointed vigilantes from the Republic kidnapped him and returned him to Johannesburg. There he was a great embarrassment to the government, which disavowed his abduction and permitted him to leave the country. Prior to his arrival in London, however, Pretoria had asked for his extradition for trial on the charge of murder. London's final decision remains to be seen but, by the time the request had been made, the ringleader, school teacher Frederick Harris, had been sentenced to death.

Scarcely had the Harris case closed when another major sabotage trial began, with all the defendants Europeans. They included Hugh Lewin, the co-editor of the *Bantu Drum*, Raymond Eisenstein, a journalist, and Bertram Hirson, a physics lecturer at Witwatersrand University. Obviously, a different type of person is now falling afoul of the sabotage law, and the subsequent convictions and long sentences for all the defendants point to a different orientation for both the government and the more vigorous opponents of its racial policies.

Even more astounding was the trial—for membership in the Communist party—of Abraham Fisher, Q.C., leading defense counsel at the "Rivonia" trial. Fisher had scarcely doffed his robes when he was held for three days under the 90 day detention powers of the government and then released without explanation. He was then arrested under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1949, but permitted bail. At his trial, which opened in Johannesburg in January,

1965, the government was building its case on the testimony of agent Q018 of the South African police, G. G. Ludi, who testified in a James Bond manner on his penetration into the South African Communist party and his discovery of Fisher's membership.

REPRESSION SPREADS

What all this might mean for future counsel of unpopular defendants was not clear, but it was certainly not hopeful. Late in 1964, the Minister of Justice announced that "communist" faculty members in state-subsidized institutions would be dismissed as of New Year's Day, 1965. Legislation was introduced in the 1965 session of Parliament aiming at the disbarment of any "communist" lawyer. In view of the broad definition of "communist," the government seemed to be meeting terror with repression of all dissent.

However, the government did yield on its 90 day detention clause, which has permitted it, since 1963, to hold persons without charges for three months, and then to renew the detention. Growing criticism from Afrikaans journals about the futility of the clause and its bad effect upon world opinion moved the government as other criticism had not. Furthermore, by the close of 1964 the chief dissidents had been silenced by conviction or by flight. In January, 1965, the Ministry of Justice announced the "suspension" of the clause, to the obvious relief of *Die Burger*, which, however, declared that the power *had* been necessary. None of this indicated that the government was not prepared to deal ruthlessly with those opposing its racial policy of apartheid.

Colin Rhys Lovell was a Fulbright research fellow in South Africa in 1955 where he also lectured. He reads, writes and speaks Afrikaans. Among his written works are *English Constitutional and Legal History* (London: Oxford University Press 1962) and many articles, including one on "Racial theories of South Africa" appearing in *Contemporary Political Ideologies* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1961).

BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS. By VERNON MCKAY (New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 468 pages, list of sources and index, \$6.75.)

This book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on African affairs. A comprehensive presentation of Africa's foreign relations with the outside world, it is organized into four main sections: 1) Africa and the United Nations; 2) Pan-African, Afro-Asian and Eurafrican Movements; 3) Africa's Relations with India and the Soviet Union; and 4) American Policy in Africa. The focus of the book is on developments since the end of World War II. In view of the many changes that are continually occurring in Africa south of the Sahara, students of Africa will find this an invaluable reference work.

The author notes that "in learning to deal with the new leaders of Africa, we are handicapped by our habitual impulse to brand them 'wrong-headed' or still worse, 'pro-Communist,' when they minimize or disagree with the values we tend to regard as 'absolutes' for all the world—the superiority of free enterprise, the virtues of Western democratic forms, and the righteousness of the Western position on Berlin, nuclear testing, and other cold war crises. After long years of having to accept decisions made by Europeans, African leaders feel a strong compulsion to form their own judgments, not only about Africa but about the outside world as well. Their attitudes toward us will be more and more affected by our ability or inability to understand their view of the world. Naturally we want them to appreciate our view of the world too. In the long run, however, it is the prosperous West, not impoverished Africa, which has the most to lose from misunderstanding."

A.Z.R.

AFRICA AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD. EDITED BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. 272 pages, index. \$5.00.)

The "discovery" of Africa is well underway. Both blocs are actively engaged in influence-building among the new African nations. "The purpose of this book is to examine Communist policies toward Africa; it is not a book about Africa as such, nor even about African Communism. It is a collective effort by the contributors to present a contemporary analysis of the programs adopted by the various Communist states to establish their influence among the new African states south of the Sahara, to consolidate their positions there, and to use these positions to further their goals."

The contributors—Alexander Dallin, Alexander Erlich, Christian R. Sonne, Robert and Elizabeth Bass, William E. Griffith, Richard Lowenthal, and Zbigniew Brzezinski—bring their knowledge of international communism to focus on Africa and, in a series of six essays, elucidate the essentials of Soviet, Eastern European, Yugoslav, and Chinese political, economic, and ideological activities in the area. A.Z.R.

ALSO ON AFRICA

The following notes are by Walter Skurnik. See also his article on page 207.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA. EDITED BY E. A. G. ROBINSON. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964. 733 pages, index, \$21.00.)

This book contains a panoply of specialists' papers presented at the 1961 meeting of the International Economic Association; it is a valuable reference work on practical aspects of African economic development. Part I presents 9 regional and country anal-

yses covering all Subsaharan Africa except Gambia, the Sudan, Somalia, and the Portuguese areas of Guinea and Mozambique (Angola is treated in a separate essay). Part II, beginning at page 281, consists of 16 papers on functional problems, such as finance, agriculture, mining, education, and relations with the world economy.

THE WEST AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH. By C. W. NEWBURY. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1964. Xiv + 97 pages, bibliography, index, \$3.75.)

The three thoughtful lectures in this volume will greatly enrich the readers' perspective. The first lecture traces the "Evolution of British Government" whose aim was to "create a synthesis between African political structures and alien rulers." The second discusses cooperation and tensions between the new élites and the traditional chiefs. The third, on "Current Perspectives," finds the West African Commonwealth fast becoming a "cultural association" in conflict with Pan-Africanism.

ONE-PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE IVORY COAST. By ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 274 pages, index, \$7.50.)

The ten chapters of this excellent book are arranged in four parts. Part I covers introductory background to 1945; Part II traces the rise of the ruling party; Part III discusses the consolidation of power; and Part IV treats salient aspects of present political dynamics and trends in the Ivory Coast.

Professor Zolberg's findings confirm the conclusions of other observers. He suggests, for example, that the ruling party "genuinely represents . . . most strata of the population," thus allowing for a measure of interchange and compromise within the party. The clarity and careful documentation of the study should help dispel some of the misconceptions concerning the feasibility of Western democracy in developing nations. Dr. Zolberg draws some useful paral-

lels between Ivoirien politics and those of American machines, suggesting that such phenomena appear when the proper conditions exist.

The political régime of the Ivory Coast emerges from this book as paternalistic, led by "benevolent managers," more democratic than the colonial administration which it replaced, and whose greatest strength may well be in the effective bonds between the people and their charismatic leader, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny.

NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES: POWER IN AN EMERGENT AFRICAN NATION. By RICHARD L. SKLAR. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963. Xii + 578 pages, appendices, bibliography, index, \$12.50.)

This is not merely a valuable addition to material on Nigeria but also an exhaustive study of the political process in that Federation during the last ten years of colonial tutelage. Following an introductory chapter, the book is divided into three Parts: Part I covers the history of political parties, Part II consists of five case studies highlighting party conflict at local and national levels, and Part III is devoted to structure of party and society.

The significant contribution is the relation of the organization and structure of the three major parties to the social setting in which they operate. Thus, the author discusses the patronage system, the importance of traditional authority and of economic, ethnic, religious, and other interest groups, as well as the role of emergent classes.

Mr. Sklar notes that there is no present danger to the party system from either bureaucracy or armed forces, and challenges the assumption that the growth of democratic institutions need be imperiled by emphasis on economic development; he finds that "conflicts . . . have been channeled into party competition" and that the gulf between the people and their leaders is not so great as in other African nations.

THE MOSSI OF THE UPPER VOLTA.

BY ELLIOTT P. SKINNER (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. 236 pages, glossary, bibliography, index, \$6.50.)

Professor Skinner has written an absorbing story that begins with a discussion of the traditional setting of the Mossi, with special reference to the Mogho Naba of Ouagadougou (a kind of *primus inter pares* among the other three Mossi kings), and ends with the transformation of the Mossi chiefs into ordinary citizens of the new Republic of Upper Volta.

Although the Mossi initially offered strong resistance to the French, they were not equipped to withstand the invader, whose policies (ie., banning important rituals, administrative gerrymandering, crushing taxes and prestations, and the secularization of the political process) combined to sap traditional powers slowly but effectively. The Mossi chiefs were both unable and unwilling to adapt to the new order: they "were operating in one political structure, the politicians in another and more important one." Dr. Skinner's book is a lucid account of the impact of enforced modernization on a fascinating African setting.

ON AFRICAN SOCIALISM. By LÉOPOLD SÉDAR SENGHOR, translated by Mercer Cook. (New York: Praeger, 1964. 173 pages, \$4.95, paper \$1.95.)

The three closely reasoned essays contained in this volume, written between 1959 and 1962, represent the formal contribution of President Senghor of Senegal to the emergent doctrine of African socialism. In them, the Senegalese statesman, poet, and philosopher has made a major effort toward the definition of a new doctrine designed to serve Africans on their road to modernization.

Senghor's African socialism may be regarded as both method and myth. As method, it helps African leaders confront successfully the gigantic tasks of national construction. This includes Senghor's con-

cept of Négritude which asserts the dignity and identity of Africans, the theory of the primacy of the ruling party in national decision-making, and a mélange of socialist form and traditional African spirit.

In addition to enjoying millet and rice, man, according to Senghor, lives essentially by myths which are his "spiritual nourishment." The myth in Senghor's doctrine is an inspirational device justifying and promising a better future through peaceful evolution and cooperation. The author is dedicated to humanistic universalism in which individuals can realize their potential as creators of culture, and nations can outgrow their present micro-nationalism in a new, planetary civilization. The book is another landmark in the intellectual achievement of Africa as well as a penetrating assessment of some African, Western, and Communist values.

AFRICA: A FOREIGN AFFAIRS READER. EDITED BY PHILIP W. QUIGG. (New York: Praeger, 1964. 338 pages, index, \$6.95, paper \$2.50.)

This volume presents a collection of essays published in the magazine *Foreign Affairs* over the past forty years. The 24 articles are arranged in historical perspective and grouped in five parts, labelled respectively "Zephyrs of Change," "The Differing Faces of Colonials," "Self-Government, Ready or Not," "African 'Isms,'" "Dead End in South Africa," and "The New Leaders."

Its great merit is its graphic presentation of a continent in change. No greater contrast could be imagined than that between the attitude of Lord Lugard, who in 1926 wrote about the "primitive savage" in Africa and the "dual mandate of the European," and the selections by African intellectuals such as Presidents Léopold Senghor of Senegal and Sékou Touré of Guinea. The book is indispensable as solid background material for anyone concerned with African affairs, international relations, and the nature of colonialism.

THE AFRICAN PRESENCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By ARNOLD RIVKIN (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. 262 pages, appendices, index, \$3.95.)

Mr. Rivkin takes a long, sympathetic but hard look at Africa; he does not approve wholeheartedly of everything he sees and says so. Hence he performs a valuable service by raising issues to be considered along with studies by other uncritical observers.

The African presence is interpreted as dual in the sense of two basic tendencies: those formerly associated with the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups—the structures were ephemeral but the orientations remain. This dychotomy is the theme of the book. It is manifest in state structures (one federation vs. the unitary trend), in political systems (authoritarian vs. democratic), in economic development (undue haste vs. slower speed), in visions of African unity (political vs. economic and technical cooperation), as well as in selected topics such as the Africans' impact in the United Nation, irredentism, and the arms race.

From the point of the view of the Rule of Law, Africa "is in for violent times." On the one hand, some states "have the potential to jeopardize world peace"; on the other, the majority "bring a serious restraining influence, . . . peaceful change and friendly relations." Although there are reasons for questioning the reality of such a dual analytical framework, the author nonetheless shows a thorough understanding of fundamentals borne out by more recent events in Africa.

AFRICAN SOCIALISM. By WILLIAM H. FRIEDLAND AND CARL G. ROSEBERG, eds. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. 278 pages, bibliography, index, \$6.75.)

This collection of analytical essays fills a yawning need for a preliminary treatment of African socialism. It brings together fragmentary and relatively inaccessible materials, and defines the outlines of the new

doctrine through an examination of economic, sociological, ideological, and "political" components. In addition, the book contains four essays on five national programs, as well as an appendix reproducing important statements by African leaders.

A HISTORY OF THE GAMBIA. By HARRY A. GAILEY (New York: Praeger, 1965. 209 pages, appendices, bibliography, index, \$6.50.)

Coming out just before Gambia's independence, this timely study traces the pre-colonial and colonial history of a nation whose boundaries are "perhaps the most ridiculous . . . ever drawn." Two of the ten chapters are devoted to the Gambia's economy, and thus reflect the new nation's most crucial problem and the implications for future external ties.

THE WORLD AT LARGE

THE RUSSIAN JEW UNDER TSARS AND SOVIETS. By SALO W. BARON (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964. Russian Civilization Series, General Editor, Michael T. Florinsky. 427 pages. Index, \$7.50.)

The Russian Civilization Series is designed to provide a non-technical but high quality analysis of key problems of Tsarist and Soviet Russia. The so-called "Jewish Question" has been an integral part of the Russian political and social landscape for centuries. With clarity and scholarly detachment, this volume traces the demographic, educational and professional condition of the Jews under various Tsars. The vacillating attitudes of successive Soviet leaders is developed. In general, the author is optimistic about the future of Soviet Jewry, believing as he does that the Soviets will not continue to squander the creative contributions that an unfettered minority could make to Soviet society, and "that in any long historic process reason must ultimately prevail." A.Z.R.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE FAR EAST (4th ed.). By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. (New York: Macmillan, 1964. 776 pages, index, \$8.50.)

Professor Latourette, renowned Far Eastern historian, has updated his standard introductory text. In lucid, plain, and interesting style he surveys the course of events in China, Japan, India, and what he calls "the lesser lands"—including Mongolia, Korea, and the southeastern countries—from the ancient period up to 1963.

C. S. Lee
Univ. of Pennsylvania

THE TRANSFER OF INSTITUTIONS.
EDITED BY WILLIAM B. HAMILTON. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1964. 312 pages, index, \$8.00.)

This valuable anthology focuses on the impact of the transplantation of institutions upon the nations of the (British) Commonwealth. The contributors are specialists, distinguished in various disciplines and areas. "Most of the essays . . . consider aspects of the transmission of institutions and practices to areas already settled, with ancient cultures of their own, rather than to areas open to colonization."

Students of political and economic development will find this is an informative, useful and stimulating book.

A.Z.R.

THE DYNAMICS OF NATIONALISM:
READINGS IN ITS MEANING AND DEVELOPMENT. EDITED BY LOUIS L. SNYDER. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1964. 382 pages, index, \$7.95, cloth, \$4.95, paper.)

Professor Snyder has compiled a highly useful collection of 159 readings on the meaning, origins, characteristics and historical growth of nationalism in the European countries, the United States, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

A.Z.R.

THE VENDÉE. BY CHARLES TILLY.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. 373 pages, appendices, maps and index, \$8.50.)

In the countryside of western France, one of the most backward parts of the country, rebellion broke out in March, 1793, the uprising of nobles, priests, peasants and rural artisans against the revolutionary regime which they had come to resent more and more since 1790. Fighting for King and Church, but above all against a new interfering order and against its bourgeois representatives—their neighbors, the rebels held the forces of the Republic in check and threatened to destroy the Revolution itself. Defeated by the end of 1793, they would not be completely quelled for six more years.

This was the rebellion of the Vendée, and its gory story has often been told. Professor Tilly does not attempt a new description: he gives us, rather, a socio-economic analysis of the circumstances leading up to the rebellion, placing political developments in novel and suggestive sociological perspective. Shunning generalizations, Tilly shows the diversity of factors leading to the rising and to the disturbances of 1791–1793 preceding it, on the one hand, and, on the other, how the struggle between the countryside and the newly industrializing and growing cities affected the whole development of the counterrevolution. In the process, he provides the best demonstration of his view that "the commonplace procedures of sociology can often aid immensely in unsnarling historical problems, just as a great deal of the knowledge perfectly familiar to working historians can only be ignored by the sociologist to his peril."

This is not narrative history. Professor Tilly provides not diverting relaxation but intellectual pleasure. His is an important book. Clarity, sense of humor and the avoidance of any kind of jargon make it also singularly readable.

Eugen Weber

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Resolutions on the Congo

In September, 1964, the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity met in Addis Ababa to examine the Congo problem, its repercussions on neighboring states and on the African scene at large, and appealed for an end to the fighting. In December, as the situation in the Congo worsened, the United Nations Security Council also reviewed the crisis. Excerpts from the O.A.U. resolution of September 10 and the complete text of the Security Council resolution of December 30 follow:

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE O.A.U.

1. Appeals to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to stop immediately the recruitment of mercenaries and to expel as soon as possible all mercenaries of whatever origin who are already in the Congo so as to facilitate an African solution.
2. Notes the solemn undertaking of the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to guarantee the security of combatants who lay down their arms.
3. Requests especially all those now fighting to cease hostilities so as to seek, with the help of the Organization of African Unity, a solution that would make possible national reconciliation and the restoration of order in the Congo.
4. Appeals to all the political leaders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to seek, by all appropriate means, to restore and consolidate national reconciliation.
5. Decides to set up and to send immediately to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Kingdom of Burundi an *ad hoc* Commission consisting of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic, Upper Volta and placed under the effective Chairmanship of H. E. Jomo Kenyatta, Prime Minister of Kenya, which will have the following mandate:

- (a) to help and encourage the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the restoration of national reconciliation in conformity with paragraphs 2 and 3 above.
- (b) to seek by all possible means to bring about normal relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours, especially the Kingdom of Burundi and the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville).
6. . . . [NB: This paragraph is of a technical nature only].
7. Appeals strongly to all Powers at present intervening in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to cease their interference. The Member States are further invited to give instructions to these Powers with the view of impressing upon them this appeal.
8. Requests all Member States to refrain from any action that might aggravate the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or worsen the relationship between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Noting with concern the aggravation of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Deplored the recent events in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Convinced that the solution of the Congolese problem depends on national reconciliation and the restoration of public order,

Recalling the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council,

Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Taking into consideration the resolution of the Organization of African Unity dated 10 September, in particular paragraph 1 relating to the mercenaries,

Convinced that the Organization of African Unity should be able, in the context of Article 52 of the Charter, to help find a peaceful solution to all the problems and disputes affecting peace and security in the continent of Africa.

Having in mind the efforts of the Organization of African Unity to help the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the other political factions in the Congo to find a peaceful solution to their dispute,

1. *Requests* all States to refrain or desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo;

2. *Appeals* for a cease-fire in the Congo

in accordance with the Organization of African Unity's resolution dated 10 September 1964;

3. *Considers*, in accordance with the Organization of African Unity's resolution dated 10 September 1964, that the mercenaries should as a matter of urgency be withdrawn from the Congo;

4. *Encourages* the Organization of African Unity to pursue its efforts to help the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to achieve national reconciliation in accordance with resolution CM/Resolution 5 (III) dated 10 September 1964 of the Organization of African Unity;

5. *Requests* all States to assist the Organization of African Unity in the attainment of these objectives;

6. *Requests* the Organization of African Unity, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter, to keep the Security Council fully informed of any action it may take under this resolution;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General of the United Nations to follow the situation in the Congo, and to report to the Security Council at the appropriate time.

Indonesia Withdraws from the U. N.

On January 21, 1965, Indonesia handed United Nations Secretary-General U Thant a letter announcing Indonesia's decision to withdraw officially from the United Nations on March 1, 1965. Excerpts of the letter follow:

On December 31, 1964, the head of our permanent mission in New York conveyed to your excellency the content of President Sukarno's statement on that date, to the effect that Indonesia would withdraw from the United Nations if neo-colonialist "Malaysia" be seated in the Security Council. Pursuant to that statement I have to inform you that on January 7, 1965, after the seating of "Malaysia" as a member of the Security Council, our Government, after very careful

consideration, has taken the decision to withdraw from the United Nations.

My Government was fully aware of the great weight and impact of such a decision, but in the circumstances which have been created by colonialist powers in the United Nations so blatantly against our anti-colonial struggle and indeed against the lofty principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, my Government felt that no alternative had been left for Indonesia but with-

drawal from the United Nations. Summing up and balancing all their considerations in their negative and positive aspects, we have come to the conclusion that our decision may become the catalyst to reform and retool the United Nations in spirit and in deed, lest the present atmosphere of complacency shown by the neo-colonial powers may undermine the lofty principles of the United Nations, and consequently the decline of the United Nations as an international body for collective security and harmonious cooperation may become irrevocable.

These feelings have already been reflected by many members of the United Nations and most of them already felt that something had to be done soon.

Already in 1960, in his address before the General Assembly on September 30, President Sukarno reminded the United Nations of its shortcomings both politically and organizationally; the need for retooling was strongly felt. Yet, at that time, Indonesia had no intention to leave the United Nations, imperfect as it might be. For us the problem of "Malaysia" within the United Nations was just the further proof of this international body being manipulated by colonial and neo-colonial powers.

"Malaysia," which formation was rejected by two out of the three signatories to the Manila agreement, was then forced into the United Nations by deliberate avoidance of any voting on September 17, 1963. It was a successful maneuver of neo-colonial powers in the United Nations. Indonesia voiced its disapproval of such a maneuver. But we were patient enough until another absurd colonial maneuver occurred, namely the pushing of this "Malaysia" into the United Nations Security Council. This makes a mockery of the sense of the Security Council itself, since according to Article 23 of the Charter, the election of a nonpermanent member of the Security Council should be guided by the importance and contribution of the candidate-country in the maintenance of peace and security in the world. . . .

Indonesia had no intention to obstruct the work of the United Nations and much less

to wreck the United Nations, but it felt obliged to point out in the strongest way what the United Nations indeed should not have done.

This decision of my Government is of course a revolutionary one, unprecedented as it may be. This, however, was taken for the good of the United Nations itself, which in our view need a strong reminder from time to time. It might even be that this decision of my Government could well entail a beneficial effect for the speedy solution of the problem of "Malaysia" itself. Arrogance displayed so far for a settlement based on previous agreements might be dissolved, in the general desire for the just solution of burning and acute problems in Southeast Asia as a whole.

As to your personal appeal, Mr. Secretary General, that Indonesia should not withdraw from its cooperation with the United Nations, I want to assure you that Indonesia still holds the lofty principles of international cooperation as enshrined in the United Nations Charter. These, however, can be implemented outside as well as inside the United Nations' body.

Indonesia has been active in the field of international cooperation for a better world, and it will continue to do so. However, due to the serious reasons I mentioned above, Indonesia has decided at this stage and under the present circumstances to withdraw from the United Nations and in addition also from the specialized agencies like the F.A.O., UNICEF and UNESCO. A separate letter will be sent to those specific agencies.

While our actual withdrawal from the United Nations has been already carried out in New York as of January 1, 1965, I would suggest that due to the technical winding up of the Indonesian Permanent Mission in New York and reciprocally your office in Indonesia, officially our representative offices would be closed on March 1, 1965. I would appreciate it highly if you would be helpful in having the office of the Indonesian Mission in New York maintain its official status till 1 March, 1965, which will also be the case of the United Nations office in Jakarta.

THE O.A.U.

(Continued from page 200)

O.A.U. having "solved" these festering conflicts.¹⁶ As a matter of fact, although the Moroccan-Algerian affair has been quiescent, the triangular Ethiopian-Somali-Kenyan affair continues with more or less vigor and bloodshed to dominate and distort the relations of these three neighboring states.

As significant and revealing perhaps of the nature and performance of the O.A.U. are the African disputes that have not been referred to it. Chief among these is the continuing border controversy between Dahomey and Niger, which has for over a year troubled the relationship of these states. Sporadic violence, expulsion of each other's nationals, economic boycotts and loud recriminations have been the order of the day. The now transformed Union of African and Malagasy States proved unable to handle the dispute. The O.A.U. has apparently not been asked to take jurisdiction by the parties nor has it taken an initiative.

Even more significant and revealing of the nature and performance of the O.A.U. is the special meeting of foreign ministers held early in 1964 in Dar-es-Salaam at the urgent request of Tanzania (then the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar). Following on the heels of military rebellions in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya and their suppression by the United Kingdom at the request of the respective governments of the three states, President Nyerere asked the O.A.U. convocation to help him find a way to cope with the demoralizing situation of a rebellious military put down by the former colonial power and now disbanded as untrustworthy. After much abortive discussion about O.A.U. joint commands and military assistance, the meet-

ing gave its seal of approval to what had in fact already been agreed bilaterally between the parties, i.e., short-term Nigerian and Ethiopian military assistance in maintaining internal law and order while a new Tanzanian force was developed and trained.

The convocation failed to come to grips with the basic issue of how to insure the development of adequate military force in the new states, while avoiding an arms race among African states. The convocation also failed to come to grips with the related issue of how to regulate the flow into Africa of external military assistance—arms, munitions, equipment and the variety of inevitable military missions that accompany such assistance. These failures foreshadowed the O.A.U.'s subsequent inability to deal effectively with the renewed Congo crisis, for one of the central issues in the crisis has always been the absence of adequate Congolese military forces and the influx of external military assistance to take up the slack.

Finally, the Liberation Committee established by the O.A.U. and based in Dar-es-Salaam to aid and abet the national liberation of the remaining colonies on the African continent by any and all means, including force, has been a storm center. Ghana particularly has been critical of the activities of the Committee, of which it is not a member. Ghana has charged that the Committee has not been effective or aggressive enough in waging "national liberation struggles." The Committee and the O.A.U. generally have agreed that the Committee has been as effective and aggressive as circumstances have permitted, noting that Ghana's failure to support the Committee's work morally and financially has not made the task easier.

Deeply embedded in the controversy has been Ghana's resentment of the Committee's original decision recognizing the Angolan government-in-exile of Roberto Holden as the only one entitled to its assistance in preference to the more left-oriented exile group favored by Ghana. In November, 1964, the Committee modified its position and decided to provide aid again to the group led by Agostinho Neto.¹⁷ Irrespective of the merits of

¹⁶ Both of these cases are dealt with at some length in the author's forthcoming book, *Nation-Building in Africa*. There is conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia; between Somalia and Kenya; and between Somalia, on the one hand, and Ethiopia and Kenya on the other.

¹⁷ *West Africa*, No. 2483, January 2, 1965, p. 9.

the controversy, the very fact of its existence once again demonstrated the diversity of national interests and conflicts of policy.

The establishment of the Liberation Committee has also had some important side effects revealing the nature and performance of the O.A.U. Dar-es-Salaam has been transformed from a haven of peace into a center of intrigue, conspiracy and controversy. Both Malawi and the Congo (Leopoldville) have charged Tanzanian-based intrusion in their internal affairs. The implication has been that part of the important influx into Tanzania of arms and men, instead of being directed toward liberating the Portuguese colonies, has been misdirected toward subverting governments of independent African states which are disapproved of by their neighbors.

ASSESSMENT AND OUTLOOK

The O.A.U. provides a structure and a framework within which to discuss and define problems among African states and, hopefully, to reconcile differences and resolve disputes. The latter functions—political functions—can, and probably will, mature with time. This has been the experience of its model, the O.A.S. It has also been the experience of the United Nations.

In the non-political field, the O.A.U. unfortunately has only had limited success. At year's end, in December, 1964, the O.A.U. had to cancel two meetings—of its commission on defense and its commission on health—because of lack of quorums. The commissions are the specialized agencies of the O.A.U. and offer the best opportunities for solid achievement and for building unity among the many African states. Unfortunately, they have been overshadowed by heads of state conferences and political issues, and one suspects that instead of providing building blocks for African unity the commissions have for the present been relegated to the position of reflecting the attitudes of the O.A.U. members on the larger political issues. It may not be entirely accidental that

the O.A.U. members, in a state of crisis over the Congo, have had little time or inclination for the less grandiose problems being dealt with by their commissions. Hopefully, these functions also will mature with time. They are the "bread and butter" issues which gave much of the shape and form to the O.A.S. and, many would also say, to the United Nations and its affiliates in their early days.

For the future, the important point is the inherent limitation on the organization's capacity; expectations of what it can do and should be asked to do should be geared to the realities of the organization. In the words of President Senghor once again:

In the Congo, there cannot be two standards. One cannot encourage the rebellion in the Congo and at the same time combat it. If we truly want to strengthen the Organization of African Unity and build together the future of Africa, all the states must keep themselves from intervening in the internal affairs of other countries.¹⁸

The O.A.U. is an organization *for* establishing unity and not *of* unity. To expect more, and to ask more, is to court disappointment and disaster. Where basic conflicts exist between African states and national interests of African states sharply diverge, as they do in the Congo crisis, then the O.A.U. is likely to have limited influence and less success. Where there is a general consensus or where, as in the Moroccan-Algerian situation, the parties are looking for a face-saving way out of an impasse, the O.A.U. is likely to have more influence and greater success.

Even more important for the organization's future is the behavior of the organization's members. In this regard, the Nigerian Prime Minister "has spoken out loud and clear." In late January, 1965, in a message to the O.A.U. Scientific, Technical and Research Commission, meeting in Lagos, "he warned . . . that a deviation from the basic provisions of the O.A.U. Charter would result in serious consequences for each and every one of us and for the future of Africa." In another message to the O.A.U. Educational and Cultural Commission, Sir Abubakar "again warned that some political events in Africa have tended to cast doubt on the realism and efficacy of our organization [the OAU]." The

¹⁸ As quoted in *Cahiers de l'Afrique Occidentale et de l'Afrique Équatoriale*, No. 269, December 12, 1963, p. 36. (Translation from the French by the present author.)

Lagos broadcast quoting the Prime Minister then concludes:

For all member states of the O.A.U., a clear rethinking is imperative. No one is interested in an organization where members meet to exchange meaningless speeches and pious sentiments. The O.A.U. must be revitalized. It must be made stronger and efficacious or nothing.¹⁹

If there was any ambiguity about the Nigerian estimate of the O.A.U.'s performance and any question about the quality of the Prime Minister's advice, Lagos radio the next day had this to say:

The root cause of the O.A.U.'s muddle in the Congo crisis is clear. Sovereignty is sovereignty. The Charter of the O.A.U. insures every member state of nonintervention in its internal affairs. We respected this principle in other crises . . . but when it comes to the Congo crisis some African leaders want to apply a different standard. Their personal hatred of Mr. Tshombe colors their interpretation of the true legal and constitutional position of their states and the O.A.U. in the Congo crisis. It is not yet too late to arrest the situation in the Congo and save the O.A.U. The beginning of wisdom of this matter is the immediate realization by all African leaders that no one can bypass the legal government of the Congo Republic and impose whatever solution it likes on the Congolese people. The current session of the ad hoc committee [the Ad Hoc O.A.U. Commission on the Congo] must learn this lesson as a matter of urgency.²⁰

There is little more that could be added to the Nigerian diagnosis and prescription. The problem is primarily one for the African states. To the extent that extra-African influences are a factor, they can be helpful only to the degree that they are realistic in their appreciation of the capabilities of and the constraints on the O.A.U.

¹⁹ Lagos Nigerian Domestic Service (in English), 1800 GMT, January 28, 1965.

²⁰ Lagos Nigeria Broadcast to Africa (in English), 1700 GMT, January 29, 1965.

TANZANIA

(Continued from page 223)

terms of putting up decorations or arranging receptions—on the contrary he has made it clear that he wants to see development proj-

ects, castigating or giving praise according to the progress he sees. His visits provide local people with "targets" for the achievement of their plans and the enthusiasm with which they work to please him is amazing to those of us more accustomed to the cynicism of the developed world.

A 1965 progress report on the United Republic of Tanzania, then, would show the Union fairly strong after 12 months, especially now that people have learned not to expect too much of it immediately. Security and stability have been almost completely restored in both parts of the Union; indeed, some liberals might complain of too great a concern for security. The chief problems of Tanzania, and the fears of its people, now arise from outside.

Fear, particularly of the United States, means that not all decisions are made rationally. The country, a center of African politics in many ways, and under considerable pressures, is determined to remain as independent of binding ties as possible. And yet Tanzania must rely on foreign capital and technical assistance—to combine with its own undoubted enthusiasm and determination in the urgent and all absorbing task of development.

ZAMBIA AND RHODESIA

(Continued from page 206)

isters, and are afraid to publish certain kinds of information, while radio and television have been subject to increasing pressure from the government. Unrest in the African rural areas and the activities of security forces there are not fully reported. Two African townships attached to Salisbury, the capital city, are under strict emergency regulations, and it is an offense to publish any material about them which is likely "to cause alarm or despondency." The dismissal of the commanding officer of the Rhodesian army for refusing to support unconstitutional action such as a unilateral declaration of independence and the disregard by the government of carefully documented allegations of widespread police

brutality against Africans arrested on security charges are further indications of the collapse of normal government in Rhodesia.

At the time of writing, it is impossible to foretell what the immediate future holds in store for this troubled country. It is safe to predict, however, that Rhodesia will continue to occupy a prominent place in the columns of the world's press for a long time to come.

WEST AFRICA

(Continued from page 212)

dams for irrigation and electric power in Senegal, Mali, and Guinea. Port facilities at St. Louis and Kayes are to be improved, and Mauritania will benefit from irrigation of the fertile valley inside her borders. Negotiations, begun in earnest in 1962, are bearing fruit. A quadripartite organization was set up in August, 1964, with headquarters at St. Louis, and Robert N'Daw of Mali was chosen Secretary-General.

Some form of association between Senegal and Gambia appears inevitable. Frontiers are permeable, and the two regions share close similarities in ethnic, linguistic, religious, and social structures. Gambia's national independence in February, 1965, followed numerous talks between President Senghor and Premier D. K. Jawara. Both are committed to gradual close cooperation in areas of mutual interest. Senegal, wary lest economically weak Gambia become a burden to her, or a center of subversive activities, favors a joint diplomatic and defense establishment and the improvement of trans-Gambian communications into Casamance in southern Senegal. Jawara must proceed with caution in view of criticism from his political opposition. Nonetheless, despite other differences due to the colonial imprint and Gambian concern over Senegalese domination, there are enough ties between the two "neighbors" to warrant close and reciprocally beneficial association.

A second type of regional cooperation is based on the combined efforts of several nations producing a single commodity as they

look for better terms in international trade. One such effort is the African Groundnut Council, which held its first working session in June, 1964. Including Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, and Upper Volta (Mali has observer status), the Council seeks common policies on the marketing of peanuts and their byproducts. Closer effective collaboration must no doubt await the alignment of the price of Senegalese peanuts to that of the world market in 1965.

Also in this category is the Cocoa Producers Alliance, whose members (Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Togo, Cameroun, and Brazil) produce over 85 per cent of the world's cocoa. As a first step, the Alliance has agreed on a common price for export. It is too early to assess the Alliance's effectiveness; last year's good crop and the unusually low world market price have uncovered tensions among Alliance members, not all of which are anxious to carry out the common decision to destroy part of their stocks to increase the market price.

The third type of regional cooperation aims at the development of inter-African trade. Reciprocal commercial exchanges are still relatively unimportant; but efforts are made to increase them on the basis of need. One of these efforts is the Togo-Dahomey-Nigeria Union (T.N.D.U.), which had been proposed in 1962 by the late Sylvanus Olympio of Togo. The idea was launched anew in 1964 by President Sourou-Migan Apithy of Dahomey. Since that country no longer "belongs" to the Entente, and since Apithy has never in the past hesitated to abandon old friends and seek new ones, it was to be expected that Dahomey's economic and political ties be altered. The revitalized T.N.D.U. is one step in this direction.

An African Commercial Union was set up last May among six nations—Dahomey, Upper Volta, Niger, Guinea, Togo, and Tunisia—with Mali and Algeria possibly to join later. For several years, Niger had been particularly disappointed with the failure of the West African Customs Union created in 1959 to salvage some economic benefits from the dissolving French West African federation.

That country therefore took the lead in this new grouping designed to control the importation of some basic products through group purchases which would eliminate costly intermediaries.

Finally, plans are being weighed for an embryonic West African "common market" in a contiguous four-state area which includes the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. A special committee is making a study of prospects for a coastal "common market" and is scheduled to report its findings during the first half of 1965.

This pilot project will be watched closely by other African nations, in view of the economic and political difficulties to be overcome. Each member belongs to a different trade zone and has its own currency, one of which (the Guinean) is not freely convertible. It is probable that the Ivory Coast joined the effort for political reasons to compensate for the loss of President Houphouet's influence resulting from the Dahomey revolution and the demise of the U.A.M. But the four nations' exports are not exclusively competitive, and success will depend upon the ability to find areas of mutual interest and to remain faithful to them in the face of possible political friction.

One main motif in the West African political symphony is the tension between piano and fortissimo in the modernization scores for the twentieth century. Conductors have their hands full in trying simultaneously to control, cajole, pacify, and assimilate the players, to prevent other potential conductors from replacing them, and to educate a faithful mass audience asking for continuous encores from the national symphony orchestra. Some established soloists, as well as some subpublics, are fretful and yearn for their own ensemble; and some neophytes, sensing a state of flux, wish to compose entirely new music resounding with brass, cymbals, and drums.

The other major motif in West Africa is the erection of altars to the gods of African unity. Most leaders have lowered their sights from the ultimate vision of continental government to the patient construction of

building blocs as a possible foundation for a later, larger edifice. By avoiding sensitive political disputes arising from fears of domination, subversion, and competition, and by concentrating on mutually advantageous economic cooperation schemes, the road to the future may be less spectacular but more effective than that leading straight to the "political kingdom."

THE CONGO

(Continued from page 218)

improbable that the countryside under rebel influence can be brought under any kind of control in the near future. In purely local terms, this has probably resulted in uninhibited destruction (especially of those things which can be identified as European in origin) and anarchy.

At the political level, the rebellion has lost its capital but has gained considerable international support, notably among the radical African states and the Communist countries, but also among some middle-of-the-road states. A military solution will therefore be difficult to achieve. However, a negotiated settlement is unlikely so long as Tshombe is prime minister.

Nonetheless, since even Belgium and the United States are now reported to be pressing for a political solution, a new prime minister acceptable to all factions may emerge in the not too distant future. But even if this positive development were to take place, it would still prove difficult to alleviate the anarchic, revolutionary conditions which now prevail in the rural areas of much of the Congo.

ERRATA: We regret the following errata in the article on Indonesia by Benedict R. Anderson in our February, 1965, issue. The title should read, "Indonesia: Unity Against Progress." 2. On page 77, left column, line 12, the figure should read "\$1.2 billion"; 3. On page 81, left column, lines 25 and 26, the phrase "as reflected in her January, 1965, withdrawal from the United Nations" was inserted by our editors and not by Mr. Anderson.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of February, 1965, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Feb. 22—At a 2-day meeting, West Germany and France clash over a French proposal that the Common Market establish common prices for beef products by April 1.

European Free Trade Association

Feb. 22—At a ministerial meeting of the E.F.T.A., Britain announces that it will reduce its 15 per cent surcharge on imports to 10 per cent, effective April 27.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

Feb. 9—The Commissioner for Agriculture in the E.E.C., Sicco Mansholt, reveals that he has reached agreement with the U.S. to delay negotiations on agricultural items until September 15. The agreement must be approved by the other parties to the Kennedy round of tariff-cutting discussions, now under way in Geneva.

Feb. 12—The preliminary phase in the Kennedy round ends.

International Monetary Fund

Feb. 26—The I.M.F. announces that its members have agreed on details for increasing their quotas in the I.M.F. by 25 per cent.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Feb. 10—It is announced that U.S. Admiral Thomas Moorer will succeed Admiral Harold P. Smith as Supreme Allied Commander in the Atlantic. Smith will retire on May 1.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Feb. 17—At a meeting of financial and eco-

nomic officials from the member states, the U.S. and Britain are criticized for failing to balance their international payments.

United Nations, The

Feb. 1—The General Assembly recesses until February 8 because of the deadlock over unpaid assessments for the U.N.'s peace-keeping operations. Under Article 19 of the U.N. Charter, any member 2 years in arrears shall lose its vote in the General Assembly. The Soviet Union and France, among others, would lose their votes if this provision should be enforced.

Feb. 8—U.N. Secretary-General U Thant addresses the General Assembly. He urges members to contribute not less than 80 per cent of their assessments in 1964 to defray the U.N.'s operating expenses for 1965. The contributions would be voluntary because the U.N. has adopted a nonvoting procedure to avoid a direct clash on the unpaid assessments issue. He lists other pressing business before the Assembly.

Feb. 12—U Thant appeals to the parties involved in the Vietnamese crisis to negotiate a peaceful settlement. He proposes that the Geneva conference on Indochina be reconvened.

Feb. 16—The Albanian delegate, Halim Budo, asks that a vote be taken in the General Assembly on whether or not to continue the nonvoting system set up over 2 months ago. General Assembly President Alex Quaison-Sackey recesses the Assembly until February 18.

Feb. 18—In a roll-call vote, 97–2, the General Assembly supports President Quaison-Sackey's ruling that the Albanian proposal is out of order. (The U.S. has agreed not to challenge the vote under Article 19.) The Assembly creates a Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, authorizes

U.N. expenditures equal to those in 1964, asks members to contribute voluntarily 80 per cent of last year's assessments. The Assembly adjourns until September 1 without approving an agenda or electing vice-presidents and committee chairmen.

Feb. 27—The U.N. announces that a 33-man commission to work out a solution to the arrears payments issue has been formed. The chairman is General Assembly President Quaison-Sackey.

ALGERIA

Feb. 11—An Algerian delegation in Communist China signs an agreement whereby the Chinese Communists will help equip the new Popular Militia.

ARGENTINA

Feb. 25—The chairman of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Council, W. W. Rostow, ends a 4-day visit. He is optimistic that Argentina will be able to alleviate her inflationary problems.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, THE

Canada

Feb. 15—Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson speaks at ceremonies unfurling the new Canadian (maple leaf design) flag.

Cyprus

Feb. 19—Speaking in Athens, Greece, the U.N. Mediator for Cyprus, Galo Plaza Lasso, suggests that Greek and Turkish Cypriotes hold communal talks to open the way for a settlement of the Cyprus situation.

Gambia

Feb. 18—Gambia, the last British colony in West Africa, becomes independent. Prime Minister David K. Jawara speaks at ceremonies in which the Union Jack flag is replaced by the Gambian flag.

Ghana

Feb. 8—In a treason trial, 5 Ghanaians, including 2 former cabinet ministers, are found guilty and sentenced to death.

Great Britain

Feb. 1—Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Philip are welcomed to Ethiopia at the start of an 8-day visit.

Feb. 2—Addressing the House of Commons, Prime Minister Harold Wilson outlines economic plans and reforms. He announces that 2 military planes, the P-1154 fighter and the HS-681 transport plane, will not be put into production.

Feb. 3—Wilson cancels a trip next week to the U.S. and the U.N. because of the U.N. deadlock. He was to address the General Assembly.

Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip arrive in the Sudan for a 4-day visit.

Feb. 11—Following an unsatisfactory pay award announced earlier this week by Wilson, the leaders of the British Medical Association advise British physicians to resign from the National Health Service.

Feb. 16—The opposition Conservative party reorganizes its "shadow cabinet"; Reginald Maudling is given the post of foreign secretary.

Feb. 18—French President Charles de Gaulle invites Prime Minister Wilson to Paris for talks in April.

Feb. 22—Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan announces that Britain will cut its 15 per cent surcharge on imports to 10 per cent, effective April 27.

India

Feb. 11—Two cabinet ministers resign to protest the adoption (on January 26) of Hindi as the official language of India.

Feb. 12—Rioting in southern India to protest the adoption of Hindi continues; some 21 persons have been killed.

Feb. 17—In an address prepared by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri for President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, parliament is advised that English will remain as an "associate official language" as long as non-Hindi-speaking Indians so desire.

Malaysia

Feb. 10—Great Britain orders more men and ships to Southeast Asia as a cautionary

defense step because of Malaysia's conflict with Indonesia.

Uganda

Feb. 13—Prime Minister Milton Obote accuses the Congo of bombing 2 Ugandan villages along their mutual border. The U.S. is charged with having supplied the planes to the Congolese. (See also *Congo*.)

Feb. 16—Rioters demonstrate against U.S. support for Congolese Premier Moise Tshombe. The U.S. flag is torn down at the U.S. embassy in Kampala.

Feb. 18—It is reported that Ugandan troops have crossed into the Congo Republic and are attacking Congolese towns and that the Ugandan troops may be a spearhead for Congolese rebels.

BRITISH TERRITORIES, THE

Bermuda

Feb. 8—After dockworkers refuse to unload a grain ship because of sympathy for striking electric company workers, army and navy troops carry off the cargo.

Feb. 9—The Bermuda Industrial Union asks all workers striking in sympathy for electrical employees to return to their jobs.

Rhodesia

Feb. 21—Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Arthur Bottomley and Lord Gardiner, the Lord Chancellor, arrive in Rhodesia on a 10-day mission. They will meet with white and black Rhodesians to sound out their feelings on independence.

Feb. 25—Bottomley meets with Joshua Nkomo, African nationalist leader, who is brought to the talks from a detention site.

BURMA

Feb. 18—at the end of a 6-day visit to Pakistan, General Ne Win, chairman of Burma's governing Revolutionary Council, and Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan issue a joint statement decrying the situation in Southeast Asia.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Feb. 8—*Hsinhua* (official Chinese press

agency) condemns U.S. aggression towards North Vietnam. (See also *Vietnam*.)

Feb. 15—Marshal Chen Yi, Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, speaks at a reception at the Soviet Embassy in Peking to celebrate the 15th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Chen Yi declares that "peaceful coexistence with United States imperialism . . . is out of the question."

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Feb. 1—in Brussels, Congolese Premier Moise Tshombe and Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak open discussions on settling financial questions between their countries.

Feb. 6—an agreement between Tshombe and Spaak is reached under which some \$300 million in securities held by Belgium will be given to the Congo. Private Belgian interests in mining companies (formerly jointly owned) will be placed under the Congo government. The Congo government will be given at least 3 seats on the board of directors of the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga. The Congolese government will compensate Belgian private interests for their losses.

Feb. 8—Tshombe returns home.

Feb. 19—Premier Tshombe accuses Ugandan troops of invading Congolese territory; he demands their withdrawal. He denies Ugandan charges that Congolese planes bombed 2 Ugandan villages last Saturday.

CUBA

Feb. 15—Premier Fidel Castro removes Carlos Rafael Rodriguez as head of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform; Castro himself assumes Rodriguez' job.

Feb. 17—a communiqué announcing the signing of a Soviet-Cuban trade agreement for 1965 and a payments pact for 1965-1970 (under which Cuba will pay back Soviet loans) is released.

FRANCE

Feb. 3—*The New York Times* reports that

the French government is adopting rules to limit U.S. "colonization" of French companies, i.e., to prevent U.S. companies from gaining control of French businesses.

Feb. 4—At his 11th news conference, President Charles de Gaulle proposes a 5-power conference (France, the U.S., Russia, Britain, and Communist China) to amend the U.N. Charter; he calls for a return to the gold standard in international monetary affairs; he declares that the question of German reunification is a "European problem."

Feb. 10—Following a meeting between de Gaulle and his cabinet, Minister of Information Alain Peyrefitte issues a statement urging that the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina be reconvened to work out a peaceful settlement for Laos, Cambodia, and North and South Vietnam.

Feb. 11—Lecturing at the University of Paris law school, Finance Minister Valery Giscard d'Estaing suggests that international debts be paid in gold, and that the major powers pledge, in a "solemn and unequivocal declaration," to do so.

Feb. 21—After 3 days of private discussions in Washington with U.S. President Lyndon Johnson and other leaders, French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, interviewed on a U.S. television program, urges that negotiations for a Vietnam settlement begin "as soon as possible." (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

(See also *German Federal Republic* and *U.A.R.*)

Feb. 24—President Walter Ulbricht arrives in Cairo.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Feb. 1—The West German ambassador to the U.A.R. is called home for consultations. West Germany has protested the forthcoming visit of East German leader Walter Ulbricht to the U.A.R. (See also *U.A.R.* and *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Feb. 10—West German sources report that Chancellor Ludwig Erhard has temporarily halted the \$80 million military aid program for Israel following Egyptian threats to recognize the East German government if West German aid to Israel continues.

Feb. 15—It is reported that West Germany has notified the U.A.R. that it will terminate economic aid to Cairo if Ulbricht is permitted to visit.

Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol declares that West Germany should honor its commitment to Israel.

Feb. 24—The West German cabinet issues a statement that it will support legislation introduced in the parliament to extend the statute of limitations for the prosecution of Nazi war crimes. The 20-year statute will expire May 8. Such an extension would require a constitutional amendment.

Following Ulbricht's arrival in Cairo, West Germany suspends economic aid to the U.A.R.

GREECE

Feb. 1—Premier George Papandreu arrives in Yugoslavia for an official visit.

HONDURAS

Feb. 17—Elections for a new Constituent Assembly are held. Official results show that the National party, which has supported the military junta that took power 16 months ago, has won 35 of the 64 Assembly seats.

INDONESIA

Feb. 15—Members of the National Front (a government-directed group) demonstrate before the American Cultural Center (the U.S. Information Service Library) in Jakarta, to protest U.S. actions in Vietnam. The Indonesian government takes control of the building.

Feb. 26—The Minister of Estates, Frans Seda, makes public a government decree announcing that Indonesia has seized rubber plantations owned by U.S. companies, the U.S. Rubber Co. and Goodyear.

Tire Co. The decree recognizes the ownership rights of the U.S. firms; the plantations will be placed under Indonesian management.

ISRAEL

(See *German Federal Republic, U.A.R., and U.S. Foreign Policy.*)

LAOS

Feb. 1—One of the military leaders of yesterday's shortlived (15 hours) coup d'état, Colonel Bounleut Sykosy, meets with Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Premier. Rebel troops will withdraw 15 miles from Vientiane.

Feb. 3—Street fighting in Vientiane pits loyal Laotian troops under General Kouprasith Abhay against rebel troops under General Phoumi Nosavan and the national police force. Phoumi Nosavan is a deputy premier representing rightist sentiment in the government.

Feb. 6—it is reported that General Phoumi Nosavan has fled to Thailand.

NETHERLANDS, THE

Feb. 26—The coalition cabinet under Premier G. M. Marijnen resigns following failure to agree on introducing commercial television to the country.

SPAIN

Feb. 24—Some 5,000 university students led by 4 professors demonstrate for more freedom; they battle with police.

SUDAN, THE

(See *British Commonwealth, Great Britain.*)

Feb. 18—Premier Sir-el-Khatim el-Khalifa and his 15 member cabinet resign following pressure from right-wing groups.

Feb. 19—The 5-man Council of State asks el-Khalifa to form a new government.

Feb. 23—Leftists demonstrate to protest the formation of a right-wing cabinet; el-Khalifa has offered leftists 4 of the cabinet posts, but his offer was rejected.

SYRIA

Feb. 17—The Syrian government announces

that it has uncovered a spy ring working with the U.S. embassy. The second secretary in the U.S. embassy, Walter S. Snowden, is accused of being the link between the embassy and the spy ring; his expulsion is ordered.

Feb. 23—Farhan Attassi, 37-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen, is hanged as a spy. He is a first cousin of Dr. Nureddin Attassi, the deputy premier. A Syrian army major, charged with being an accomplice, is executed by firing squad.

TURKEY

Feb. 13—After being defeated on his 1965 budget in the Grand National Assembly, Premier Ismet Inonu announces the resignation of his government.

Feb. 16—President Cemal Gursel names Senator Suat Hayri Urguplu as Premier.

Feb. 19—It is reported that Urguplu has formed a 4-party coalition government.

U.S.S.R., THE

Feb. 4—It is disclosed that Trofim D. Lysenko has been removed as director of the Institute of Genetics of the Academy of Sciences. Lysenko is a controversial biologist who believes that an organism can transmit to its progeny characteristics acquired during its lifetime. His Institute of Genetics will be reorganized and renamed the Institute of General Genetics.

Feb. 6—Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin leaves for North Vietnam after an overnight stop in Communist China, where he met with Premier Chou En-lai.

Kosygin receives a tumultuous greeting upon arriving in Hanoi. (See also *Vietnam.*)

Feb. 9—in Moscow, Vietnamese and Chinese Communist students attack the U.S. embassy to protest U.S. aggression against North Vietnam.

Feb. 10—the U.S. White House issues a statement warning the Soviet Union that its failure to protect the U.S. embassy in Moscow could adversely affect diplomatic ties.

Feb. 11—in Pyongyang, capital of North

Korea, Premier Kosygin is honored at a state dinner. He urges Communist unity.

Feb. 15—Kosygin returns to Moscow.

Feb. 21—*Pravda* (Communist party newspaper) carries an article denouncing anti-intellectualism during the Khrushchev era and "incompetent administrative interference in literary affairs." The article upholds limited freedom of artistic expression.

Feb. 26—In a television broadcast about his trip to Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam, Premier Kosygin warns the U.S. that its continued aggression against North Vietnam will escalate the war beyond "its original boundaries."

Feb. 27—*Tass* (official press agency) announces that to date 17 delegations from Communist nations have arrived in Moscow prior to the opening of an international Communist conference on March 1.

Feb. 28—Premier Kosygin, in East Germany attending the Leipzig trade fair, terms the U.S. White Paper on Vietnam "a black book." (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Feb. 7—The official Middle East News Agency announces a warning by President Gamal Abdel Nasser that the U.A.R. will break off diplomatic ties with West Germany if German arms shipments to Israel continue. (See also *Germany, Federal Republic*.)

Feb. 23—It is reported that secretly Kuwait has loaned some \$98 million to the U.A.R. within the last 2 weeks.

Feb. 28—in Cairo, visiting East German leader Walter Ulbricht and Nasser confer.

UNITED STATES, THE Agriculture

Feb. 4—In his farm message to Congress, President Lyndon B. Johnson distinguishes the economic problems of commercial farmers from those of rural Americans. He asks for the continuation of price support and income support programs. (See also *U.S., Gov't.*, Feb. 10.)

Economy

Feb. 4—The Labor Department announces that in January the unemployment rate dropped to 4.8 per cent.

Feb. 10—In a special balance of payments message to Congress, President Johnson outlines measures to help reduce the U.S. balance of payments deficit. To cut U.S. spending overseas, Johnson proposes that tourists' duty-free allowances on overseas purchases be reduced from \$100 to \$50. He also appeals to U.S. business and banking firms to curtail voluntarily investments and loans overseas.

The Commerce Department announces that U.S. international payments showed a \$1.445 billion deficit for the fourth quarter of 1964.

Feb. 17—President Johnson addresses the National Industrial Conference Board (composed of presidents and board chairmen of corporations and banks). He announces that the standards under which businessmen can write off the cost of new equipment will be liberalized, in effect nullifying a business tax rise of \$700 million scheduled for 1965. He appeals to the business community to help achieve the social and economic objectives of the Administration.

Feb. 18—President Johnson addresses 370 corporation and bank executives on the U.S. balance of payments deficit. He urges U.S. corporations to reduce by 15-20 per cent their investments abroad; U.S. banks are asked to curtail foreign loans by 75 per cent.

Feb. 25—The Federal Reserve Board announces that U.S. gold reserves declined by \$262 million in the month of January; about \$190 million in gold was purchased by France.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Vietnam*.)

Feb. 2—McGeorge Bundy, President Johnson's special assistant for national security affairs, leaves for Vietnam.

Feb. 3—President Johnson declares that he is willing to visit the Soviet Union and

invites Soviet leaders to the U.S. He hopes a round of visits can be held before the end of 1965.

Feb. 7—Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, in a nationwide television broadcast, announces that U.S. retaliatory bombings against North Vietnam today caused "considerable damage." The bombings retaliated against 3 Vietcong (pro-Communist) rebel attacks, one of which was directed at the U.S. military compound near Pleiku where 8 U.S. soldiers were killed.

President Johnson orders the evacuation of 2,000 U.S. dependents in South Vietnam.

Feb. 9—Defense Secretary Robert McNamara announces that the U.S. has agreed to sell Great Britain \$650 million worth of military equipment, primarily jet fighter and jet transport planes; a U.S. contract with the Australian government provides for the U.S. sale of some \$350 million of military equipment.

Feb. 11—The White House issues a statement declaring that air attacks today against North Vietnam were "in response to further provocations by the Hanoi regime."

Feb. 12—in a radio broadcast, the Liberation Front (parent organization of the Vietcong rebel movement) declares that it will retaliate against "any [U.S.] aggression against our heroic Vietnam."

Feb. 17—President Johnson confers with ex-President Dwight Eisenhower on the crisis in Vietnam.

French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville arrives in the U.S.

In remarks before the National Industrial Conference Board, Johnson asserts that the U.S. wants "no wider war" in Vietnam but will take justifiable and necessary actions to meet "the continuing aggression of others."

The U.S. State Department acknowledges that it was a secret partner in the West German-Israeli military pact. (See also *Germany, Federal Republic*.)

Feb. 18—Defense Secretary McNamara's remarks before the House Armed Services

Committee are made public. McNamara asserts that Vietnam has become a test area in the Sino-Soviet power struggle, and that the U.S. must stand firm in Vietnam if Communist expansion into Southeast Asia is to be blocked.

In a statement issued by the U.S. State Department, the private boycott of West German goods imposed by some U.S. manufacturers in retaliation for the West German suspension of military aid to Israel is deplored. (See also *Germany, Federal Republic*.)

Feb. 20—*The New York Times* reports that after 3 days of talks between Couve de Murville, President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk, the U.S. has rejected French proposals for negotiations on Vietnam.

A party of 4 U.S. Peace Corps volunteers in Venezuela are mistaken for terrorists and shot at. One American is killed and one is wounded.

Feb. 22—Speaking at the University of Kentucky, where he receives an honorary doctor of laws degree, President Johnson affirms U.S. global responsibilities; he describes the U.S. as "too concerned" to "withdraw from this world."

Feb. 23—Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman departs on a diplomatic tour of the world. He will visit Israel first.

Feb. 26—Henry Cabot Lodge, former Ambassador to Vietnam, is called in by President Johnson to serve as a special consultant on the Vietnam crisis for several days.

Feb. 27—The U.S. State Department releases a 64-page White Paper on Vietnam asserting that North Vietnamese infiltrators are the "backbone" of the Vietcong rebels in South Vietnam. The paper also notes that the question of war or peace in Vietnam will be determined by the North Vietnam government.

Government

Feb. 2—President Johnson, in a message to Congress, urges that the District of Columbia be given self-rule.

The Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Sargent Shriver, and the Ad-

ministrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, Robert Weaver, announce an experimental project to renovate some 450 tenements on a street in New York City's Harlem district.

The Senate approves the nomination of William Driver as administrator of the Veterans Administration.

Feb. 6—White House Press Secretary George Reedy discloses that the President will send a message to Congress urging that it act to eliminate unfair restrictions on the right to vote. President Johnson issues an executive order establishing a Council on Equal Opportunity under the chairmanship of Vice-President Hubert Humphrey. The Council will have cabinet-level status and will coordinate the civil rights activities of all federal agencies.

Feb. 8—The Treasury Department recommends legislation to limit the financial activities of charitable foundations to prevent abuse of their tax exempt status.

In a Special Message to Congress on Natural Beauty, President Johnson outlines a federally-enforced program to halt air and water pollution. He also proposes the establishment of new parks and recreation areas.

Feb. 9—The House of Representatives passes a bill abolishing the 25 per cent gold reserve requirement for Federal Reserve deposits.

Feb. 10—After Senate-House conferees reach agreement, Congress passes a \$1.6 billion agricultural supplemental appropriation, enabling the Commodity Credit Corporation to continue the farm price support program. A House rider, prohibiting the President from continuing surplus food shipments to the U.A.R., is eliminated. The bill also stipulates that the closings of some veterans hospitals and farm research stations are to be postponed until May 1.

Feb. 12—President Lyndon Johnson nominates Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs and a Special Assistant to the President, to serve as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. He replaces Averell Harriman, who will

serve as Ambassador at Large. The Ambassador to Panama, Jack Hood Vaughn, is named Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs.

An official of the Office of Economic Opportunity outlines a preschool summer program for 100,000 underprivileged children, known as Project Head-Start, in 300 rural and urban pockets.

Feb. 13—President Johnson swears in Nicholas de B. Katzenbach as attorney general and Ramsey Clark as deputy attorney general.

Feb. 15—in a special message to Congress on the District of Columbia, President Johnson proposes improved schooling, health and welfare programs, and an anticrime campaign.

The White House announces that Postmaster General John A. Gronouski will be reappointed for 4 years more.

Feb. 16—President Johnson appeals to Americans to support his medicare program for medical care for the aged to be financed through Social Security.

Feb. 18—Following a decision earlier this week by a U.S. Circuit Court judge permitting the New Haven Railroad to apply for the termination of passenger service; the New Haven Railroad asks the Interstate Commerce Commission to allow it to discontinue passenger service to 4 stations in Westchester County, New York.

The Senate approves a bill to eliminate the 25 per cent gold reserve requirement for Federal Reserve deposits.

Feb. 24—in a written reply to questions by the Senate Rules Committee investigating the affairs of Robert (Bobby) Baker, Walter W. Jenkins, formerly a special assistant to President Johnson, denies that he ever pressured Don Reynolds, an insurance salesman, to buy advertising time on the Johnson family's television station.

In testimony before the Senate Judiciary subcommittee investigating invasion of individual privacy by government agencies, it is disclosed that the Post Office's lists of persons wanting to receive Communist material from overseas will be burned. The Post Office has maintained lists of

the recipients' names and addresses.

Feb. 25—A federal grand jury issues an indictment against the Communist party of the U.S. for failing to register under the Internal Security Act; the government claims that a volunteer was willing to register for the party. In a 1963 ruling, a U.S. Court of Appeals held that the Communist party could not be forced to register unless the government could prove that some individual, risking self-incrimination, had volunteered to register.

Feb. 28—The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights issues a report charging that discriminatory practices exist in the administration of federal programs, such as agriculture and education, in the South. President Johnson asks U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman to report to him within 30 days on the actions that the agriculture department will take to end anti-Negro discrimination.

Labor

Feb. 1—Labor Secretary W. Willard Wirtz, on behalf of President Johnson, requests that longshoremen return to work in ports where a settlement has been reached between shipping companies and the International Longshoremen's Association.

Feb. 4—Three nonoperating railway unions, that refused to accept the wage agreement signed by 7 other nonoperating unions last year, reach agreement on a new contract with the nation's railroads.

Feb. 5—For the second time, the New York Shipping Association appeals to President Johnson to act to end the 27-day port strike.

Feb. 7—Five nonoperating railroad unions and the railway industry reach agreement on job protection and job transfers for union members.

Feb. 9—Elections are held for president of the United Steelworkers of America.

Feb. 10—President Johnson names a 3-man informal committee to study the issues in the dock strike and to recommend a settlement.

Feb. 11—Federal Judge Sidney Sugarman

signs a temporary 5-day injunction ordering striking longshoremen in New York to return to their jobs. New York longshoremen have signed a new contract with shipping industry owners.

Feb. 12—The I.L.A. agrees to send its members back to work in all ports where contract agreements have been signed. The I.L.A. has rejected the 3-man presidential panel's recommendations for a full settlement.

Feb. 13—Longshoremen return to work in New York, Boston, Baltimore and other cities. The strike continues in Galveston, Houston, Miami and other ports.

Feb. 16—The chairman of the 3 tellers responsible for tabulating the election results of the United Steelworkers contest declares that the official count will be slow. The race was between Steelworkers President David McDonald and Secretary-Treasurer I. W. Abel.

Feb. 22—The executive council of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. opens its winter meeting in Florida. A.F.L.-C.I.O. President George Meany, at a news conference, declares that the United Steelworkers of America ought to extend the May 1 deadline for a new contract in the hope that lengthy negotiations, if necessary, may avert a strike.

Feb. 23—The executive council of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. issues a statement supporting the Administration's medicare plan for the aged; the statement condemns the American Medical Association's alternate "elder-care" plan as "empty promises."

Feb. 27—In a formal statement on the economy, the A.F.L.-C.I.O. executive council urges a federal program for public works in cities to create jobs and a federal program to redevelop depressed areas. The Council warns that an economic slowdown is possible and will create further unemployment. A \$2.00 hourly minimum wage is recommended.

Military

Feb. 1—The Air Force Chief of Staff, Curtis E. LeMay, resigns. General John P. McConnell is sworn in as his successor.

Feb. 16—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration launches the Pegasus satellite. It has a wingspan of 96 feet and is to record data on the damage that meteoroids may inflict on spaceships.

Feb. 17—The Ranger 8 space vessel is successfully launched from Cape Kennedy, Florida. This moon shot carries 6 television cameras to take pictures of the moon and radio them back to earth.

Feb. 18—Defense Secretary McNamara delivers his annual "military posture" analysis before the House Armed Services Committee, in closed session. A summary of his remarks, containing unclassified material, is made public. McNamara estimates that a Soviet nuclear attack on military targets alone in the U.S. in the early 1970's would kill 122 million persons. If urban areas were the targets, some 149 million would be killed.

Feb. 20—Ranger 8 hits the Sea of Tranquillity on the moon after radioing back to earth 7,000 pictures of the lunar surface. The pictures will be used to help determine a landing site for a man-on-the-moon shot.

Politics

Feb. 8—Meeting in Washington, outgoing Republican National Chairman Dean Burch, his successor Ray C. Bliss, Senator Everett Dirksen and Representative Gerald R. Ford Jr. agree to expand the Republican Coordinating Committee, a new group which will meet for the first time in March.

Feb. 14—The text of a speech to be delivered tomorrow by Dean Burch is released for publication. He reaffirms the conservative principles supported by Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater and declares that the Republican party should build its strength around these principles.

Segregation

Feb. 1—Over 770 Negroes are arrested in Selma, Alabama, while protesting discriminatory voter registration. Dr. Martin Luther King, among those arrested, chooses to remain in jail rather than post bail. Some 500 of the demonstrators are stu-

dents who stayed out of school to picket the Dallas County Courthouse.

Feb. 2—in New York City, 2 more public schools for disturbed children are boycotted in the 3-week-old protest against inferior education in the "600 schools," mostly attended by Negroes and Puerto Ricans.

Feb. 3—The board of directors of the Economic Council (Mississippi's Chamber of Commerce) issues a statement urging Mississippians to respect law and order, support the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and establish interracial dialogues.

In Selma, 300 students demonstrating in front of the Dallas County Courthouse are arrested for truancy. In Marion, Alabama, 700 students staging a protest against the arrest of 16 Negroes last night are arrested by state troopers. The 16 persons were arrested for seeking service in a restaurant.

Feb. 4—in Mobile, Alabama, Federal District Judge Daniel Thomas issues an order, under a suit filed last year by the Justice Department, to the Dallas County board of registrars to speed up voter registration. He outlaws the use of the literacy test set up by the state supreme court.

President Johnson denounces discrimination in voter registration in Selma.

Feb. 5—Dr. King is released from jail in Selma.

U. S. marshals repulse 15 members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee who try to force their way into the U.S. courthouse at Foley Square, in New York. The demonstration is in sympathy with voter registration protests in Selma.

Feb. 9—Dr. King meets with President Johnson in Washington. King reports that Johnson has promised to send a message to Congress soon on a bill to secure voting rights for Negroes.

Feb. 10—Sheriff James G. Clark and a group of deputies take 165 Negro children demonstrators on a forced march from in front of the Dallas County Courthouse in Selma 2.3 miles into the countryside; they use sticks and electric cattle prods to keep

the youngsters moving.

The 6-man U.S. Civil Rights Commission begins an inquiry into civil rights violations in Mississippi.

Feb. 17—400 Negro students riot before the Board of Education in Brooklyn, New York. The students, who have been boycotting the public schools, break windows and throw bricks.

Feb. 18—300 boycotting students riot in Brooklyn's streets; they break store windows and throw bricks at policemen.

In Marion, Alabama, police clash with 400 Negro demonstrators attempting to march on the Perry County jail. One Negro is shot and 10 are hurt when struck with nightsticks. Whites attack and beat up 2 photographers and a reporter.

Feb. 20—Alabama Governor George C. Wallace prohibits nighttime demonstrations.

Feb. 21—Malcolm X, leader of a black nationalist group, the Organization for Afro-American Unity, is shot and killed while addressing a rally in New York City. He had split last year with Elijah Muhammad, leader of the racial separatist Black Muslim organization.

Feb. 23—Dr. King schedules a march in Montgomery, Alabama, for March 8, to retaliate for the ban on night marches.

Feb. 25—Federal District Judge W. Harold Cox dismisses the federal government's felony indictment against 17 of the 18 defendants charged with the murder of 3 civil rights workers near Philadelphia, Mississippi, in June, 1964. A weaker, second misdemeanor indictment stands. The 18th defendant will be tried out of state.

Feb. 26—Judge Cox orders that the 17 defendants must stand trial under the misdemeanor indictment charging all 17 with conspiring to violate an 1870 statute of the U.S. Criminal Code. Sheriff Rainey and 2 other law enforcement officers named in the indictment will also face charges of actual violation of the law.

Norman Butler, a member of the Black Muslim guard, is arrested in New York City and charged with murdering Malcolm X.

Jimmie Lee Jackson, a 26-year-old Negro shot during a night march in Marion, Alabama, on February 18, dies in a hospital.

Supreme Court

Feb. 22—Retired Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter dies of a heart attack at the age of 82.

VATICAN, THE

Feb. 25—Pope Paul VI confers the insignia of office on 26 new cardinals at a consistory in St. Peter's Basilica.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See also *U.S.S.R.*, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, and *Vietnam Republic*.)

Feb. 14—The International Control Commission is requested by North Vietnam to recall its observers.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF

Feb. 4—The Special Adviser on National Security Affairs to U.S. President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, arrives in South Vietnam.

Feb. 5—In a meeting today, Lieutenant General Nguyen Khanh is not able to persuade other factions to enter into a 20-man civilian-military advisory council. Khanh heads the junta that seized power from Premier Tran Van Huong on January 27; he is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Feb. 6—In an attack on the Vietnamese Army's II Corps headquarters near Pleiku and the air base at nearby Camp Holloway, Vietcong rebels kill 8 U.S. soldiers and wound 108 others. The Vietcong also partly destroy a fuel dump in the II Corps area.

U.S. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor confers with Acting Premier Nguyen Xuan Oanh. McGeorge Bundy is ordered to Washington to report.

Feb. 7—Some 49 U.S. fighter planes attack Vietcong sanctuaries near the border in North Vietnam, while Soviet Premier

Kosygin is visiting in Hanoi. In a White House statement, President Johnson declares that the U.S. desires "no wider war"; the retaliatory attack "was carefully limited to military areas which are supplying men and arms for attacks in South Vietnam." Feb. 8—South Vietnamese Air Force planes, accompanied by U.S. jet fighters, bomb a military communications center in North Vietnam near Vinhlinh.

McGeorge Bundy reports to Johnson and the National Security Council.

Feb. 9—*Tass* (official Soviet press agency) makes public a Soviet government statement warning that it "will be forced . . . to take further measures to safeguard the security . . ." of North Vietnam.

Feb. 10—Vietcong guerrillas attack points throughout South Vietnam.

Feb. 11—at Quinhon, a 4-story U.S. barracks housing 60 enlisted men is destroyed by Vietcong rebels.

In a U.S.-South Vietnamese communiqué, it is announced that 160 U.S. and South Vietnamese planes have attacked military barracks and supply depots in North Vietnam because of "continued acts of aggression by Communist Vietcong under the direction and with the support of the Hanoi regime."

Feb. 12—it is reported that 25 wounded U.S. servicemen have been extricated from the Quinhon barracks; it is estimated that a complete search of the rubble will reveal 21 dead.

Feb. 13—in an official Communist Chinese statement, the U.S. is warned that "aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam . . . means aggression against China . . ."

Feb. 16—the Armed Forces Council approves the appointment of Dr. Phan Huy Quat as premier and Phan Khac Suu as chief-of-state.

Feb. 17—a 20-man National Legislative Council is formed, with 2 representatives from the 4 main religious groups in Vietnam. It is reported that the Phan Huy Quat caretaker cabinet was approved yes-

terday; it includes military officers.

Feb. 19—Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao leads a military coup against General Khanh.

Feb. 20—General Khanh seizes control of Saigon from the rebels, who capitulate.

Feb. 22—it is reported that late yesterday the Armed Forces Council voted to remove General Khanh as commander-in-chief; he will be succeeded by Major General Tran Van Minh.

Feb. 23—a Soviet statement, presented to French President de Gaulle by the Soviet Ambassador to France, supports the French proposal to reconvene the 1954 Geneva conference to settle the crisis. (See also *France*.)

Feb. 24—U.N. Secretary General U Thant appeals for preliminary informal "dialogues" to pave the way for a negotiated settlement. He urges the U.S. to withdraw from Vietnam.

The U.S. embassy in Vietnam discloses that U.S. jet planes have been used in attacks against Vietcong rebels in South Vietnam during the past week. A U.S. statement declares that the attacks were staged at the Vietnamese government's request.

Feb. 25—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk says that the U.S. will not negotiate until North Vietnam agrees to respect the independence of South Vietnam.

It is reported that North Vietnam has told U Thant it supports his plan for a negotiated settlement.

U.S. jet bombers attack Vietcong forces in South Vietnam.

General Khanh departs. In his new role of ambassador at large, he will visit the U.S. and appear before the U.N.

Feb. 27—it is reported that Buddhist leaders in South Vietnam will set up a "peace movement" to work for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam and Russian and Chinese soldiers and advisers from North Vietnam.



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